



Studies in Intra-Africa Relations: Nigeria-South Africa Cooperation (1994-2015)

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Abstract. Nigeria and South Africa are big hegemons in Africa. In spite of their current rivalry on the international arena, especially for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, there is more that brings the two countries together than separates them. Nigeria's anti-apartheid policy only lasted as long as the apartheid regime in South Africa. Upon the abandonment of the racist regime in South Africa, Nigeria was more than willing to pursue warm relations with the South African government. With sufficient pressure mounted on South Africa and the rest of the International Community, the apartheid regime collapsed in South Africa in 1994. Nigeria, like other countries, then began a policy of political and economic engagements with South Africa from 1994 onwards. In spite of the fact that there are regional economic blocs in Africa, economic cooperation among African countries has not always been easy. One reason that may account for the situation is that economic factors are often linked to the political, socio-cultural and military aspects of nation building. This study investigated the origins and nature of their political, economic and socio-cultural relationship to ascertain whether this can be a template for economic cooperation among African countries. This study made use of secondary sources of data such as books, journals, articles, previous related research works from libraries and Internet sources. This study adopted a qualitative approach. Therefore, deductive analysis method was employed. This research has found that despite the fact that the Nigeria-South Africa cooperation is less than perfect as it has its many short comings; it is still an acceptable template for intra-Africa co-operation.

Keywords: Bi-lateral relations, Competition, Co-operation, Hegemony.

1. Introduction

With a democratic and majority rule in place in South Africa in 1994, South Africa quickly switched over from the pariah status in the International Community to a position of being wooed by many countries politically and in terms of business. In the wake of democratic rule in South Africa, Nigeria was pre-occupied with domestic leadership squabbles of her own which manifested itself in gross domestic human rights abuse perpetrated by Abacha's military regime. A good example is the unlawful execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni eight (8) on November 10, 1995. This change in the turn of events in Nigeria put her in the international black book and earned her South Africa's prior bad reputation. Thus, the warm relations which Nigeria had with South Africa was short-lived as the latter wanted nothing to do with Nigeria, because of her bad reputation at the time. With the restoration of democracy in Nigeria, however, Nigeria and South Africa enjoyed long years of sound political, economic, socio-cultural and military relations.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

In spite of the fact that there are regional economic blocs in Africa, economic cooperation among African countries has not always been easy. One reason that may account for the situation is that economic factors are often linked to the political, socio-cultural and military aspects of nation building. Nigeria and South Africa are regional powers in Africa and are both instrumental to the growth and development of the continent. It is expected that a relationship of co-operation should exist between them. Nigeria and South Africa are two African powers and are undoubtedly the largest economies in Africa. There is no gainsaying the fact that a strategic relationship between the two is not only beneficial but crucial to

the growth and development of Africa. This study investigated the origins and nature of their political, economic and socio-cultural relationship to ascertain whether this can be a template for economic cooperation among African countries.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this work is to investigate the origin and trends in Nigeria-South Africa relations. Therefore, the specific objectives are to examine the nature of their political, economic, socio-cultural and military relations.

1.3 Research Methodology

This section is concerned with providing information on chosen research methods and techniques for this study. This study made use of secondary sources of data such as books, journals, articles, previous related research works from libraries and Internet sources which were employed analytically with an unbiased mind to ensure the objectivity of this study. This study adopted a qualitative approach. Therefore, deductive analysis was employed in this study.

2. Political Relations

Nigeria's policy towards Pretoria took a drastic turn with the termination of apartheid regime and its replacement with black majority rule in May 1994. The total defeat of apartheid regime in South Africa meant that Nigeria had recorded a huge success in the implementation of her post-independence foreign policy goals, especially as it concerned Africa. The expiration of apartheid and its replacement with black majority rule in South Africa afforded Nigeria the opportunity to abort her anti-apartheid policy and cement genial relations with South Africa. To this effect, a consular office was established in Johannesburg, South Africa, and subsequently, an embassy in Pretoria. However, this friendship of two African giants was soon short-lived. The Nigerian military government of Gen. Sani Abacha had an ugly record of flagrant disrespect for human rights. The human right crimes heightened as the Ogoni crisis of 1995 culminated into the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others on the eve of the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand. The South African government under President Nelson Mandela did not mince words in expressing its utter disappointment in the blossoming human right ills in Nigeria.

The international community at large expressed great displeasure towards the Abacha government and soon

perceived and related with Nigeria as a pariah state. The Nigerian delegates to the 1995 Commonwealth Summit were declared persona-non-grata and Nigeria was suspended altogether from the Commonwealth at the request of President Mandela of South Africa. Thus, Nigeria and South Africa resumed cold and retracted relations with Nigeria replacing South Africa as the pariah state, and South Africa replacing Nigeria as the modern epitome of democracy in Africa. However, South Africa's involvement in Nigeria's political dilemma started before her influence in the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth. The South African leader, Nelson Mandela had been greatly involved in the restoration of political sanity and respect for human rights in Nigeria since his resumption to office.

South Africa, based on her newly formulated foreign policy objectives in accordance with her equally new democratic government, assumed the role of a 'moral prefect', advancing democracy and respect for human rights. Nigeria which at the time had experienced successive military regimes perceived South Africa's 'sudden' campaign for democracy and human rights as a means to set up a competition which Nigeria claimed she was not interested in. Abacha's human rights crimes could not have come at a worse time because of the already existing mistrust between Nigeria and South Africa. The sour relations with Nigeria only exacerbated as General Sani Abacha refused to hand off the reins of power and continued to disregard the campaigns of South Africa and the displeasure of the international community towards his regime. He ordered the arrest and detainment of Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the presidential candidate that was unanimously validated by the Nigerian electorates to have won the June 12 1993 presidential election. President Nelson Mandela, who at this time had become an international icon because of his liberation feats in South Africa during the apartheid era, visited Nigeria to plead with Abacha for the release of M.K.O. Abiola but to no avail. Mandela also sent Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a famous South African Nobel Peace Prize laureate to Abuja in April 1995 to follow-up on his plea visit; this still did not yield the desired result.

While the Nigerian government did not take cognizance of Mandela's visit and diplomatic efforts, regarding his visit as a mere solidarity visit, Mandela, as a result of his international status, charisma and leadership position in South Africa, continued to face pressures to intervene in the Nigerian political dilemma. Umezurike and Lucky point out that Banjo identified three important 'pressure groups' that pressurized President Mandela: President Bill

Clinton's administration in the United States of America, African leaders, and a combination of Abiola's family members and supporters. Similarly, in July 1995, Mandela sent his vice-president, Thabo Mbeki to Nigeria to negotiate the release of a group of purported coup plotters who were suspects in a failed attempt to overthrow Abacha's regime and were arrested and detained. Notable among those arrested were general Olusegun Obasanjo and major General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua. Mandela had anticipated that his vice, Mbeki, a seasoned diplomat and tactful negotiator with a wealth of mediatory and negotiating experience, would be able to persuade Abacha to expedite the release of his detainees. Mandela's hope however, did not materialize as Abacha made no commitment to grant the wish of the South African leadership.

At the 1995 Auckland Commonwealth Summit, Mandela, under the impression that he had Abacha's word for pardon of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others (Ogoni nine), assured the Commonwealth leaders that Abacha had reneged on his resolve to execute the Ogoni nine. Mandela's high hopes were crushed when news of the sudden hanging of the Ogoni nine reached him. The news infuriated him because he relied on his charisma and far-reaching influence to dissuade Abacha from killing the Ogoni nine. He therefore called for the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth. With this turn of events, the tables had turned between Nigeria and South Africa as Nigeria, which once orchestrated the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth, now received a taste of her own medicine.

Apart from being the brain behind Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth, South Africa launched other diplomatic offensives against the Abacha regime. In the same year, South Africa withdrew Nigeria's invite to the four-nation tournament organized by South Africa. South Africa (Mandela) went further to call for a unanimous action against Nigeria at the SADC Summit in December 1995. He brought forward charges against Nigeria of human rights abuse and illegal killing. Abacha retaliated by preventing the Super Eagles of Nigeria from defending the gold medal they won from the African Cup of Nations in South Africa in 1996. The Nigerian football team had won this medal earlier in 1994 in Tunis. As diplomatic offensives between Nigeria and South Africa heightened, Nigeria refused to attend the 1996 CAF competition in South Africa.

The sudden death of Sani Abacha led to a turn of events in Nigeria-South Africa relations. General Abdulsalami Abubakar succeeded Abacha and upon

his succession, started making efforts to sweeten the sour relationship between Nigeria and South Africa. Thabo Mbeki paid another visit to Nigeria to persuade the new leader to expedite the release of the political prisoners, provide a suitable environment for the return of exiles, uphold human rights and protect the freedom of the press. In addition to Abubakar returning the visit in August 1998, he invited Mandela to the ECOWAS Summit which was held in Abuja, Nigeria. Abubakar's military regime handed political power over to a democratically elected President; Obasanjo on 29 May, 1999. Obasanjo's first diplomatic visit upon his resumption to office was to South Africa to attend the inauguration of Thabo Mbeki as the newly elected South African President in June 1998. The duality of Mbeki and Obasanjo as democratic Presidents in South Africa and Nigeria respectively, went a long way to re-shape the abrasive relationship between both countries. The rest of the decade saw series of co-operations and bilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa.

While Mandela inherited a country wallowing in numerous socio-economic problems and was pre-occupied with solving those problems in the early post-apartheid years, Mbeki busied himself with improving South Africa's influence at the regional and global levels through her foreign policy. After the racist system that spanned over four decades came to a halt in 1994, re-construction and rehabilitation efforts were more than necessary and the buck stopped at the new leadership's table to build a strong democratic foundation and economy for the country. The immediate post-apartheid South Africa was plagued with challenges such as "democratic consolidation, socio-economic disparity, rampaging effects of HIV/AIDS, land-based issues, gender-based divisions, and deep racial cleavages".

The state of affairs of immediate post-apartheid South Africa necessitated the focus of Mandela on internal reforms and more focus on South Africa rather than Africa and the rest of the world. Thabo Mbeki's leadership activities were a sharp contrast from those of Mandela. While Mandela was pre-occupied with internal reforms, promoting the influence of South Africa in Africa and the world at large was on the front burner for Mbeki's administration. As Chidozie et al put it, "...following Thabo Mbeki's coming in 1999 as the successor to Nelson Mandela; he chose instead to actively and dominantly stamp South Africa's foreign policy on a regional and global stage. With dexterous diplomatic relations with Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Wade (Senegal), Mbeki kick-started the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and ultimately

led to the modification of the Organization of Africa's Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) in 2002.

Mbeki maximized the opportunity of South Africa's chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2000 to mount pressure on Nigeria and Algeria who were hosting the G77 Summit and the OAU respectively, to support the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme (MAP). President Wade later joined the movement with the fusion of his OMEGA Plan (a program which was majorly concerned with projects on infrastructure and education) with MAP in May 2001, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Compact for African Recovery. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was formed in 2001 and was due to the efforts of four heads of states: Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. The formation of NEPAD was necessitated by the escalating poverty level in Africa, Africa's debt accumulation, exacerbated economy etc. The primary objective of NEPAD according to Alo "is to eradicate poverty in Africa, to place African countries both individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development, and ensure Africa's integration and halt the marginalization of the continent in the global economy". The duality of Mbeki and Obasanjo indeed brought in a new dawn in African politics as evident in their promotion of democracy, as well as peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts all over Africa. Landsberg summarizes the regional accomplishments of Mbeki and Obasanjo:

In July 2000, at the annual G8 meeting, Obasanjo and Mbeki, together with Algeria's Bouteflika...made a formal case to G8 leaders...for Africa's debt relief and forgiveness, and for a deal around information technology capacities for the continent. In 2001, Obasanjo and Mbeki together with other African counterparts...stressed the importance of a new partnership with the rich North. In 2002, both leaders engaged the G8 summit...to craft a G8 Africa Action Plan...At the G8 summit in Sea Island in the US in 2004, both leaders again received a pledge from G8 leaders to fund an African peacekeeping standby force to be deployed by 2010, with a strong emphasis also placed on funding HIV/AIDS programmes in Africa.

However, there came a diplomatic reversal with the end of Obasanjo and Mbeki's administrations. Although Obasanjo's successors Alhaji Umaru Yar'Adua and Goodluck Jonathan visited South Africa shortly after they assumed leadership of Nigeria in 2008 and 2013 respectively, relations between Nigeria and South Africa never remained the same.

3. Economic Relations

Since the end of the age of military despotism and restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria, Nigeria and South Africa have shared cordial bilateral economic relations. South Africa has since been one of the highest investors in the economy of Nigeria especially in areas such as telecommunication, engineering, banking, retail, hospitality, property development, construction, terrorism among others. In Egbeulem's words, "in terms of technology and infrastructure, South Africa has an edge over Nigeria, while Nigeria has an advantage of large market potentials for investments over South Africa". This explains why there are numerous South African companies with enormous investments in Nigeria. In addition, Nigerians can be found in South Africa as businessmen, employers of labour, employees, students, expatriates etc. and vice versa. South African agricultural exports to Nigeria include tobacco, beverages, sugar, dairy and milling products while Nigeria exports goods such as cocoa, food industry residue and waste to South Africa.

In October 1999, Nigeria and South Africa appended their signatures to a document that established a joint Bi-National Commission aimed at establishing and deepening economic relations between both countries. In Akinboye's words, the Bi-National Commission "covers a whole gamut of economic spectrum including agriculture, commerce, energy, mining and solid minerals, labour and telecommunications. Its overall objective is to actualize strategic and mutually beneficial relations between South Africa and Nigeria". The Commission recorded some achievements in that the bi-lateral agreement cemented economic relations between both countries. For example, Nigeria continues to play host to many South African companies who in turn invest enormously in her economy. Table 1 shows some South African companies that have gained foothold in the Nigerian economy.

Table 1: Some South African Companies operating in Nigeria

S/N	Company	Sector
1.	MTN	Telecommunications
2.	Shoprite	Retail and Marketing
3.	Dstv/Multichoice	Media and Entertainment
4.	Standard Chartered Bank (Stanbic IBTC Bank)	Banking
5.	Protea Hotel	Tourism and Leisure
6.	SAC Oil	Oil and Gas
7.	South African Airways	Tourism
8.	Entech	Construction
9.	Umgeni Water	Beverages
10.	Rand Merchant Bank	Banking
11.	Nandos	Fast Food
12.	Steers	Fast Food
13.	South African Breweries	Beverages
14.	Wichertech	Construction
15.	LTA Construction	Construction
16.	Sasol	Oil and Gas
17.	Southern Sun	Tourism and Leisure
18.	PEP Retail Store	Retail
19.	Nu Metro	Media
20.	Broll Property Group	Real Estate
21.	Massmart	Retail and Marketing
22.	South African Oil Company	Oil and Gas

Sources: A. Adebajo, *Prophets of African Renaissance: Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Hegemons*, Ikeja: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2006.

D. Games Nigeria-South Africa Baseline Study, www.africaatwork.co.za, 2013.

I. S. Zabadi & F.C. Onuoha, "Nigeria and South Africa: Competition or Cooperation" in T.A. Imobighe & W.O. Alli (Eds.) *Perspectives on Nigeria's National Politics and External Relations in Honour of Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi*, (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 2012)

For example, South African Oil Company (SAOL) and Chevron Nigeria invested US\$500 million in gas project in Nigeria, MTN was an important part of the bidding process for Nigeria's GSM license, ESKON liaised with NEPA to improve the efficiency of power in Nigeria. One of the cardinal objectives of the Bi-national Commission was to improve relations between Nigeria and South Africa. Before 1999, commercial relations between both countries was not substantial, in 1994, South Africa exported goods that amounted to US\$8.1 million to Nigeria and imported goods worth US\$3.1 million from Nigeria (Egbeulem, 2013). The 8th session of the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission was held between 22nd and 23rd May 2012 in Cape Town, South Africa, shortly after the resolution of the yellow card diplomatic row. The objectives of the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-national Commission as summarized by Egbeulem are to:

- provide a framework for collaborative and cooperative efforts in the common endeavor to bring Africa into the mainstream of global political, social and economic developments;
- provide the basis for the governments and private sectors of both countries to consult

each other on their respective economies and investment climates with a view to promoting trade and industry;

- improve bilateral relations between the two countries in the field of technology, education, health, culture, youth and sports;
- utilize the generous endowments of both countries in human and natural resources to maximize socio-economic development, through economies of scale, global competitiveness and specialization based on comparative advantage;
- to establish the mechanisms for putting benefits of economic cooperation to the service of peace, stability, social integration and economic development in other parts of the continent."

Trade relations between Nigeria and South Africa continued to improve over the years such that by 2005 South Africa was exporting goods to the value of R3.4 billion to Nigeria and importing R4.2 billion worth of commodities from Nigeria. The table below expresses the volume of trade between Nigeria and South Africa within the context of the bi-lateral trade framework.

Table 2: Nigeria- South Africa Trade Volumes between 1994 and 2015 (In Rand)

Year	South Africa's Exports to Nigeria	Nigeria's Exports to South Africa
1994	64.3m	24.8m
1995	186.2m	27.1m
1996	182.9m	38.1m
1997	202.6m	837.8m
1998	290.9m	439.3m
1999	514m	1.23bn
2000	709m	1.26bn
2001	1.6bn	1.6bn
2002	2.7bn	3.6bn
2004	2.9bn	5.1bn
2006	3.85bn	9.28bn
2007	4.62bn	12.45bn
2008	7.11bn	15.74bn
2009	5.41bn	15.60bn
2010	4.38bn	16.08bn
2011	3.85bn	9.28bn
2012	4.62bn	12.45bn
2013	42.7bn	27.1bn
2014	10.5bn	55.7bn
2015	8.3bn	15.2bn

Source: Amusan L, *South Africa as an object of Nigerian Foreign Policy: 1960-1999, unpublished PhD Thesis, South Africa: University of South Africa, 2006.*

South Africa's exports to Nigeria include machinery, electrical equipment, appliances, wood, paper, prepared foodstuffs, beverages, plastics, rubber, chemicals etc. however, oil makes up 97% of Nigeria's exports to South Africa. By interpretation, while South Africa offers a wide range of goods to Nigeria, majority of which are value added manufactured goods; Nigeria essentially offers South Africa one raw material in the form of oil. In essence, while South Africa's exports have the potentiality of substantially growing, Nigeria's exports to South Africa are less likely to expand or multiply. As such, the trade relation between Nigeria and South Africa is lopsided with South Africa being the predominant partner. Quite a number of South African companies have dominated many sectors of the Nigerian economy. Preceding 1994, only four South African companies were in Nigeria, but with the signing of the bi-lateral agreements and the initiation of the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-national Commission, more than a hundred South African companies can be found in Nigeria and are playing significant roles in various aspects of the Nigerian economy.

The most significant investment made by any South African company in Nigeria is in the communication sector. MTN (a South African company) in 2001 was licensed by the Nigerian government to operate mobile phone network in Nigeria for which MTN paid over US\$285 million as licensing fees and expended US\$1 billion for operational set up. MTN is today the largest mobile network company in Nigeria with millions of subscribers. South African

presence can also be felt in the construction sector of Nigeria's economy. Entech for example, is an engineering firm of South African origin led a \$3 billion re-development programme of Lagos Bar Beach and Victoria Island Waterfront in 2007. In the same year, Group Five, another South African company, received the contract to construct a power station in the Niger Delta. Similarly, the largest tourism project in Nigeria at the time (in Tinapa), was a united venture between three South African companies- Standard Bank, Broll and Southern-Sun. Under the auspices of NEPAD, South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation became one of the most significant investors in Nigeria's tourism. As at 2005, it invested more than US\$1.4 billion in Nigeria's telecommunication and tourism sectors. Also worthy of note is South Africa's involvement in Nigeria's media and entertainment sector. DSTV is a significant company in Nigeria's television industry with millions of viewers. However, in August 2006, the Nigerian National Broadcasting Commission (NNBC) terminated the monopoly DSTV enjoyed for the purpose of healthy competition by granting other satellite television stations such as FSTV and Trend the same opportunities granted to DSTV. In spite of this, DSTV controlled approximately 90% of cable TV business and paid a tax summing up to about N3 billion to Nigeria between 1999 and 2006.

Nigeria also has some of her companies in South Africa in different sectors of the economy. The table below is a representation of some Nigerian companies in South Africa.

Table 3: Some Nigerian Firms Operating in South Africa

S/N	Company	Sector
1.	Dangote Industries	Construction
2.	Zenith Bank	Banking
3.	Oando	Oil and Gas
4.	First Bank	Banking
5.	Union Bank	Banking
6.	Philips Consulting	Consultancy
7.	News Media	Media and Entertainment
8.	Financial Standard	Media

Source: A. Adebajo, *Prophets of African Renaissance: Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Hegemons*, Ikeja: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2006.

Oando Oil Company was listed on Johannesburg Securities Exchange in 2005. Oando partnered with Sasol and PetroSA, two South African government-owned rich oil companies for the purpose of increased oil production, while Nigeria’s NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Commission) partnered with Sasol Oil for the purpose of converting natural gas to liquid in Nigeria. Nigeria, in an attempt to attract private and government businesses, sought to create an enabling environment for South African businesses by implementing free corporate tax, reducing import duties, encouraging absolute foreign ownership and prolonging leases. The year 2005 also saw collaborations between the banking sectors of both countries. In December (2005), South Africa’s Standard Bank and Nigeria’s Oceanic Bank negotiated the purchase of Stanbic Bank by the former. Also beginning from 2005, negotiations ensued between South Africa’s FirstRand Bank and Nigeria’s Intercontinental Bank on employable methods to ensure increased capital investments in the later.

Other industries through which Nigeria and South Africa made efforts to further improve their economic relation were the cement and the aviation industries. For example, in 2010, Dangote Industries Limited (DIL), a Nigerian-based company increased its investment in South Africa’s cement industry. DIL invested R779 million into Sephaku Cement, a South African company, making the investment the largest ever Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) made by any African company into South Africa (Vanguard News, 2010). DIL’s stake rose significantly from 19.76% to 64%. With regards to the aviation industry, South Africa supplied Nigeria with airplanes and technical support for the Lagos-Johannesburg and Lagos-New York routes, based on a co-share agreement. The partnership was, however, short-lived as the arrangement soon proved to be one-sided as Nigeria continued to enjoy the benefits at the expense of South Africa.

4. Bi-lateral and Trade Agreements

There is no doubt that Nigeria and South Africa are two adroit partners that have been committed to mutually gratifying bilateral relations since the launch of their formal cordial relations in 1994. The inception of formal bilateral relations was represented by the establishment of high commissions in Abuja (by South Africa) and Pretoria (by Nigeria) in 1994. The posting of diplomatic staff also went a long way to lay the foundations for cementing mutually beneficial bilateral relations between both countries. The rationale for bilateral relations was the recognition of the economic and political strengths of the two states as well as their critical importance in Africa. Nigeria’s strength in terms of her population size, market potential, military strength, oil and gas reserves, OPEC membership, and peace keeping activities in Africa projected her image as a strategic partner for South Africa. South Africa on the other hand could boast of a stable and robust economy with an impressive GDP, developed steel sector, laudable infrastructures, and improved service sectors; all of which caught Nigeria’s attention. These hallmarks spell relations that would be mutually beneficial to both states as well as Africa at large.

In order to further the welding of bilateral relations, the leadership of Nigeria and South Africa appended their signatures to a number of pacts and bilateral trade agreements that have also formed part of their bilateral relations. According to Ibeanu et al, since the inauguration of the Bi-National commission in 1999, over twenty agreements and pacts have been negotiated and signed by both countries. Some of the agreements include: agreement on cooperation in the fields of Mining, Geology, Exploration and beneficiation of Minerals and Energy; agreement on reciprocal promotion and protection of investment; Bi-national commission of cooperation among many others. The table below represents the bilateral agreements signed by Nigeria and South Africa.

Table 4: Bilateral Agreements between Nigeria and South Africa (1994-2009)

S/N	Agreements and Pacts	Year of Enactment
1.	Exchange of Notes on the commencement of diplomatic relations	1994
2.	Agreement on the establishment of Bi-National Commission	1999
3.	Agreement on avoidance of double taxation and fiscal evasion	1999
4.	Agreement on Defense cooperation	2001
5.	Agreement on Industrial cooperation in the field of Agriculture	2001
6.	Agreement on cooperation in the field of health and medical science	2002
7.	Agreement on immigration matters	2002
8.	Extradition treaty	2002
9.	Framework programme on cooperation in Science and Technology	2002
10.	Memorandum of Understanding on the prevention of counterfeiting postage stamps and meter impressions	2002
11.	Memorandum of Understanding on the prevention of counterfeiting of postage stamps and meter impressions	2002
12.	Treaty of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters	2002
13.	Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation	2005
14.	Agreement for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investment	2005
15.	Agreement on cooperation in the fields of mining, geology, exploration and beneficiation of materials and energy	2005
16.	Agreement on Educational cooperation	2005
17.	Trade Agreement	2005
18.	Agreement on cooperation in the fields of Arts and Culture	2005
19.	Agreement in respect of Police cooperation	2005
20.	Agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism	2008
21.	Agreement on children and persons living with disabilities	2009

Source: S. Wapmuk, *Nigeria-South Africa's Relations (1960-2008)* in A.M. Ashafa (Ed.) *Challenges for Nigeria at 50: Essays in Honour of Professor Abdullahi Mahadi*, (Kaduna: GK Press Limited, 2010)

The pacts and treaties reflected in Table 4 have gone a long way to deepen the economic relations between Nigeria and South Africa under the auspices of the Bi-National Commission. These trade pacts have been beneficial in initiating trade, investments and other natures of economic interactions between both countries. These trade agreements are to serve the purpose of easing tensions and fostering greater cooperation between the two states in other areas of interest.

On a regional level, the union of Nigeria and South Africa yielded some economic gains for Africa. Seteolu and Okuneye point out that Obasanjo and Mbeki inherited a debt ridden Africa; the Obasanjo and Mbeki administrations opted for economic diplomacy and renaissance respectively to mediate development concerns in their countries. Obasanjo and Mbeki championed the course to canvass for the forgiveness of Africa's debts and succeeded. Furthermore, Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika (Algeria) established the Millennium African Recovery Programme (MARF) in January, 2001 at Davos, Switzerland. This programme was aimed at re-establishing the confidence of foreign private establishments in Africa for the purpose of wooing Foreign Direct Investment to Africa. Nigeria and South Africa formally sought insurance from the Global North through international financial institutions controlled by them in order to protect Foreign Direct Investment to Africa in July 2001 at the OAU Summit. As a means of curbing

communicable diseases in Africa, Nigeria and South Africa canvassed for partnership between multilateral financial institutions and pharmaceutical companies to ensure access to available drugs. Amusan and Wyk posit that there is a likelihood that the combined efforts of both countries was what led to the US\$200m pledge by the United States of America to tackle HIV/AIDS in Africa. At the World Trade Organization (WTO), Nigeria and South Africa pursued the removal of US and European Union (EU) tariff barriers and agricultural subsidization in order to achieve real globalization independent of substantial aid from industrialized countries.

There is no gainsaying the fact that Mbeki and Obasanjo cemented genial economic relations which was largely symbiotic. However, the expiration of the administrations of Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo took a toll on the economic relations of their countries. The different diplomatic rows recorded between both countries beginning from 2010 further aggravated the situation. In 2011 for example, a fine of \$5.2 billion was imposed on MTN for violating the instruction of the Nigerian government to disconnect unregistered numbers. The diplomatic row of 2012 involving the deportation of 125 Nigerians from South Africa, subsequent retaliations by Nigeria, incessant xenophobic attacks against Nigerians and their businesses in South Africa, stereotyped perception of Nigerian immigrants in South Africa as criminals, illegal activities of some Nigerians in South Africans,

rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa for status of regional hegemon etc. have all taken their toll on the once affable economic relations between Nigeria and South Africa.

5. Socio-Cultural Relations

The reconstruction and rehabilitation processes of the South African economy after the abolishment of apartheid required necessary man-power. Thus, foreign expatriates migrated to South Africa to participate in the reconstruction processes. Nigerians in their large numbers moved to South Africa as professionals in various capacities to help rebuild the South African economy as well as seek greener pastures. The presence of Nigerians in South Africa for various economic reasons soon led to cementing socio-cultural relations between Nigerians and South Africans. Inter-cultural marriages soon began to ensue and became more popularized over the years. As one would expect, the inter-cultural marriages between Nigerians and South Africans led to continued procreation of children of South African and Nigerian origin.

In addition to inter-cultural marriages and shared procreation between Nigerians and South Africans, tourism also serves as a form of socio-cultural relation between the two countries. As far as tourism is concerned, South Africa 'houses' some of the most important tourist centers in Africa. Top tourist centers in South Africa include Kruger National Park, Cape Town, Kgalagadi (Kalahari) Trans-frontier Park, Stellenbosch, The Drakensberg, The Garden Route, Isimangaliso Wetland Park, Blyde River Canyon Nature Reserve, Cage Dive with Great White Sharks, Robben Island, Durban's Golden Mile, Cape Point Nature Reserve, Boulders Beach, Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, Table Mountain, Franschoek Motor Museum, Khwattu, Newlands Brewery, Groot Constantia, World of Birds, Cango Caves, Bloukrans Bungee, Oudtshoorn Ostrich Farm, Addo Elephant National Park, The Apartheid Museum, Gold Reef City, Newtown cultural Precinct, Nelson Mandela Square etc. Nigerians in their large numbers visit one or more of the notable tourist centres in South Africa annually.

6. Military Relations

Nigeria's military relation with South Africa is not as substantial as her economic and political relations. However, both countries have shared a few military interactions in recent years. For example, under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria employed South African mercenaries to help

her in the war against Boko Haram (Malik, 2016). Boko Haram is a jihadist militant organization based in North-eastern Nigeria. The organization was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 and led by Abubakar Shekau since 2009. The group started out as a non-violent organization seeking only to uphold Islamic beliefs in the Northern Nigeria. As the group continued to evolve, it became increasingly violent. Since the Boko Haram insurgency which started in 2009, thousands of Nigerians have been killed and millions displaced. It has been established that between December 2014 and April 2015, at least 147 South African mercenaries were hired by the Nigerian government to train her soldiers and also fight alongside the soldiers during the insurgents. The government of President Goodluck Jonathan engaged former South African soldiers and together with 163 Nigerian soldiers, formed the 72 Mobile Strike Group.

Similarly, in 2014, the Nigerian government reached out to South Africa for arms supply. The Nigerian government through Societe D'Equipment Internationaux (a Nigerian firm) reached out to Cerberus, a South African Company to supply her some military hardware. The sum of \$5.7 million dollars was wired to the South African firm to seal the deal. The Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa froze the money, thus interrupting the deal. Cerberus received an initial payment of R60 million (#1.2 billion) in its Standard Bank Account which it tried to refund when it could not settle its registration protocols with the South African government. Cerberus had been previously registered with the South African National Arms Control Committee (NACC), but the registration expired in May 2014, together with the marketing and contracting permits. The company's inability to complete its application processes for re-registration propelled it to make refunds to the Nigerian government. The attempt to return the money raised eye brows among bank officials and eventually led to the confiscation of the money. Sources reveal that the arms deal was not without prior knowledge of South African leadership as President Goodluck Jonathan had earlier informed President Jacob Zuma. For this reason, the seizure of the money meant for arms deal further infuriated the Nigerian government and Nigerians in general.

Prior to this failed deal, Lulu Mnuguni, the South African envoy to Nigeria had been summoned over a bungled arms deal that led to the confiscation of \$9.3 million. This brought the total amount that was seized to \$15 million (an estimated #2 billion). The \$9.3 million was loaded into three suitcases and

transported to South Africa in a private jet which landed at Lanseria International Airport in Johannesburg on 5th of September 2014. The attention and suspicion drawn by the suitcases when they were put through scanners led to their confiscation. South Africa however vowed to return the \$15 million to Nigeria. South Africa did not make good on that promise until July 2015. According to statements issued by PR Nigeria, the consulting firm making statements on behalf of Nigerian security agencies, the money was released after following some routine legal and diplomatic processes.

7. Conclusion

The study has traced the history of Nigeria's political, economic, socio-cultural and military relations with South Africa. It was established that prior to Nigeria's independence, she did not have a defined relationship with other countries of the world. This was because only independent countries could pursue formal relations with other independent nations according to the provisions of the United Nations Organization. Nigeria's large economy, population size and strategic location conferred on her a leadership role in the African continent. Therefore, Nigeria upon her independence molded her foreign policy in line with the pursuit of the welfare of Africans and decolonization of other African states. Nigeria made it clear to the international community that she would not condone racism and imperialism in all its forms in Africa.

South Africa had historically been subjected to apartheid system of government which was characterized by the ruling of the black majority by the white minority. With the sustenance of apartheid, and examples of gross disrespect for human rights, the South African government became Nigeria's arch enemy. The Sharpeville massacre which occurred barely months before Nigeria's independence is an attestation to the human rights crimes perpetrated by the South African government. South Africa's less than democratic regime put her out of favour with the rest of the international community and earned her the status of a pariah state. Thus, Nigeria, in commitment to her foreign policy utilized her influence, economic strength, military as well as political power to wage war against the racist South African government until its eventual crumbling in 1994.

The end of apartheid regime and conformity with democratic principles ought to align Nigeria with South Africa, however, the tide turned against Nigeria when consequences of the human right

crimes of her military regime caught up with her. Nigeria's military regime under the leadership of General Sani Abacha was characterized with utmost disrespect for human rights. Perhaps the most significant example was the extra judicial execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others, also known as the Ogoni nine in 1995. This singular act infuriated the international community and marred Nigeria's image among the comity of nations. With this turn of events, South Africa and Nigeria switched positions- the former as the leading African enforcer of human rights and epitome of democracy, and the later as a pariah state. The buck then stopped at the desk of South African leadership (under Nelson Mandela) to restore democracy in Nigeria.

The expiration of military system of government cum embrace of democracy, most especially the installation of President Olusegun Obasanjo, ushered in a new era for the conduct of Nigeria's foreign relations. Obasanjo saw the need to repair Nigeria's dented image among the comity of nations. The duo of Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa spelled a strategic partnership between Nigeria and South Africa, making the years between 1999 and 2007 the golden years of Nigeria-South Africa relations. The Nigeria- South Africa Bi-National Commission, transformation of the O.A.U. to AU, creation of NEPAD, deepened economic relations constitute some of the dividends of the strategic partnership.

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