



A Critical Analysis of Insurgency, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the North-East of Nigeria

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Abstract. This study gives a critical analysis of insurgency, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in the North-East of Nigeria. The study was to understand the types of insurgent activities taking place in the North-East, to have a clear understanding of the modules for reconstruction in the North-East, to assess how the insurgents are rehabilitated and to understand at what extent the civilians in the North-East are rehabilitated. This research adopted the qualitative research design. Specifically, the study used a *qualitative content analysis research design*. The population of the study is the state in the North-East Geo-political zone of Nigeria. Therefore, the study relied on data from books, records, biographies, newspapers, published censuses or other statistical data, data archives, internet articles, research articles by other researchers (journals), and databases. It is hence analysed by using content analysis, this is one of the most common methods to analyse qualitative data. From the critical analysis of literature related to reconstruction and rehabilitation in the North-East, it was discovered among others that returning the region to normalcy will also require a clear funding strategy, strong and accountable Governance and Institutional Frameworks, a rigorous Monitoring & Evaluation Framework and an effective Communication Strategy. It was also discovered that some of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the North-East Nigeria have not been rehabilitated into their various communities till date and also some of the reconstructions of the social amenities have not yet properly started. This study recommended among others that IDPs taking refuge in camps scattered across the country should be returned back to their communities and rehabilitated by the Nigerian authority to give them a new face of life to start all over again instead of leaving them stay put to continue suffering for food and infrastructural shortages in the various camps across the nation.

Keywords: Insurgency, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, North Eastern Nigeria

1. Introduction

Since the return of civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been experiencing a rising spectre of violence and insecurity bordering on natural resources (mis) management and control, citizenship question, electoral contest, religious and ethnic polarisation, and the current ferocious Islamist insurgency. To be sure, Nigeria is a country of cyclical crisis the history, dynamics and challenges of its development are deeply rooted in tension, conflicts, instability and insecurity (Abdu, 2013). The Nigerian nation-state has never enjoyed an appreciable period of stability that could guarantee security and sustainable development. Each phase of Nigeria's political history is punctuated by different security challenges - military coups, electoral violence, religious disturbances, militancy and banditry.

In northern Nigeria in particular, poverty, class interest and manipulations in the context of the struggle for the control of state power and resources associated with it have resulted in violent conflicts of different degrees and proportion (Abdu, 2010). The region has continued to experience conflicts, ranging from small-scale communal and ethno-religious violence to high-intensity insurgency of the Maitatsine in 1980s and Boko Haram in recent years. In the last three decades, northern Nigeria has been a major epicentre of violence (Adagba, Ugwu, and Eme, 2012).

The condition in the North-East continues to deteriorate and escalate to other parts of the country (Gadzama, 2019). It is within this national and regional security context that the situation in the North-East can be better explained. While it is possible to isolate the North-East for analysis, it is important to understand that the governance, which includes reconstruction, rehabilitation and security situation in the North-East, is not independent of the broader situation in Nigeria (ONSA, 2015).

Therefore, restoring and enhancing peace, stability, and social cohesion constitutes the backbone of overall recovery efforts, and builds the foundation for the effective and smooth implementation of all programme interventions. The objective of this area of intervention is to assess and then address impacts of the conflict on the social fabric, as well as on local governance and provision of justice, with particular attention to the effects on IDPs and host communities. Effective responses to these challenges will provide the social and political environment for sustainable recovery and longer-term development. Given the foregoing, the need for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the North-East is pertinent.

It is noteworthy that, the process of reconstruction involves partial or complete relocation and rebuilding the essential physical infrastructure and shelter (house) so that vulnerability levels are reduced and families are able to get back to their feet. Reconstruction therefore paves the way for long term rehabilitation.

Rehabilitation then looks at a more long-term input of reinstating lost livelihoods, introducing new economic opportunities, improving land and water management processes so as to reduce people's vulnerability and enhance capacities to handle future calamities (Ibrahim, 2013). To buttress this point further, rehabilitation primarily addresses the new or increased poverty levels that have emerged due to the disaster. Jobs and income generation measures in the construction sector provide an immediate and emergency boost to the local economy. This is followed by long term improvement in land and water management and economic opportunities that seek to upgrade local economies and reduce community vulnerability in a sustainable manner. For the process of sustainable development to take off in continuation with reconstruction, it is important that the end objective is not limited to only getting people back up to the base line levels prior to the insurgency (Ogundiya, 2010).

2. Conceptualizing Insurgency

The term, insurgency, has been seen in different ways. Three of its definitions are important in this study. There is the political conception of the term. The U.S. government defines insurgency as "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region" (Imobighe, 2010). From the international legal perspective, insurgency is seen as a rebellion, carried out by rebels, who are not recognised as belligerents,

against a constituted authority or state that has been recognized by the United Nations (Duru, 2012). Based on this analysis of professional military and security literature, where the term, insurgency, is mentioned, there is the inclination to see insurgency as any guerrilla, terrorist, militant, revolutionary, or any other form of irregular warfare that does not follow the rules, laws, and conventions of war and is usually carried out against a state (Adeniyi, 2013). This is the military conception of insurgency. In dealing with issues of insurgency in this study, the researcher would be doing so from its military and security conception. In general, and irrespective of its goals, every insurgency adopts any one or more of the methods of warfare or violence.

Another characteristic underlying insurgency is that it is usually the product of asymmetric conflict, where, *ab initio*, one party has an overwhelming and incontestable physical force and other instruments of power over the other. In such situations the people on the weaker side of the conflict fight like desperadoes to be on the favourable side of the conflict. This means that insurgents are insurgents, not by their choice, but by their intrinsic and predetermined incapacity and disadvantage (Ibiang, 2016).

By pernicious, protracted, and dynamic armed struggle in which frontal engagements with the superior forces of the adversary are avoided, insurgents try to effect radical political, social, religious, and economic change or achieve territorial and resource control as well as seek greater accommodation within the state. Broadly speaking insurgency is that armed movement or struggle seeking to overthrow an existing government using a variety of violent and non-violent tactics that include drawing support and sympathy from acquiescent population in a weak state fractured along ethnic and sectarian cleavages (Mackinlay, 2012). The consequence is that, insurgents' step into the vacuum created by the legitimacy deficits to offer a radical alternative. Insurgency on the basis of motivation, capability and *modus operandi* could be driven by greed and grievances. To these scholars, insurgency is rooted from local grievances and political failings.

In their perspective, Fearon and Laitin (2001) described insurgency as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bandits practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. According to Gompert and Gordon (2008) insurgencies traditionally, seeks to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic and ideological goals. Insurgency is "an organized rebellion aimed at

overthrowing a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict” (Abolurin, 2011).

2.1 Types of Insurgency

Insurgencies can be categorized in a number of ways; two of the most common ways are to distinguish insurgencies by their goals or by the primary method they employ. These categories are archetypes. However, many insurgencies exhibit characteristics combining multiple types, or their goals may evolve during the course of the conflict. In some conflicts, multiple insurgent groups may operate simultaneously, either competing with one another or setting aside the fact that they may have differing views on post conflict governance to form temporary alliances against the government. Moreover, the motivations of individual fighters may differ from that of the group in general, giving the insurgency a more chaotic, less unified quality. Weigand (2017) put forward the goals of an insurgency most often falls into one of five categories.

Revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures.

Reformist insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms.

Separatist insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries.

Resistance insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory.

Commercialist insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth.

Allswell, (2014), reiterated that another way of categorizing insurgencies is to focus on their organizational structure and whether the insurgents stress the political or military aspects of their struggle. Insurgents, of course, may adjust their organization during the course of a conflict.

- (i) Politically organized insurgencies develop a complex political structure before or at the same time they begin undertaking military operations against the government. These groups stress consolidating control of territory through the use of shadow

governments rather than through military power. The military component of politically organized insurgencies is subordinate to the political structure.

- (ii) Militarily organized insurgencies emphasize military action against the government over political mobilization of the population. The insurgents calculate that military success and the resulting weakening of the government will cause the population to rally to the insurgents' cause. Militarily organized insurgencies begin with small, weak, ill-defined political structures, often dominated by military leaders.
- (iii) Traditionally organized insurgencies draw on pre-existing tribal, clan, ethnic, or religious affiliations. Established social hierarchies—a system of chiefs and sub chiefs, for example often substitute for political and military structures in traditionally organized insurgencies.
- (iv) Urban-cellular insurgencies develop and are centered in urban areas. These insurgencies lack hierarchical political and military leadership structures, instead organizing around small, semi-autonomous cells. Urban-cellular insurgencies generally rely more heavily on terrorism than do other types of insurgency. Their cellular structure and reliance on terrorism can limit their ability to mobilize popular support.

3. The Nexus between Insurgency, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

Aside the human cost in the Boko Haram insurgency, the atrocities of the sect have socioeconomic implications, especially in the northeast where Boko Haram has dominance. The economic, social and psychological costs of the insurgency cannot be quantified. Commercial activities in the northeast have been reduced because of the unprecedented attacks by the sect. Banks, markets and shops do not open regularly due to the fear of the coordinated attacks from Boko Haram. According to Okereocha (2012) human capital and investors drain is hampering economic development in the northeast this is due to the attacks on banks, markets, parks and government departments. The attacks on these commercial areas have led to the migration of people to other parts of the country.

Aside the migration of people who have business in the northeast to other parts of Nigeria, foreign nationals of Chad, Cameroun and Niger are being repatriated to their home countries for what the government of Nigeria said they constitute as the members of Boko Haram. Evidence has shown that not all the repatriated nationals of the above countries are members of Boko Haram (Aduloju, Opanike, and Adenipekun, 2014).

Ovaga (n.d) asserts that under this situation, the economy of the northeast will seriously be affected if foreign citizens who contribute large quota to the development of the northeast vis a vis their economic activities are sent back to their countries of origin. The never-ending attacks by Boko Haram in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States have a severe impact on the economic lives of people living in these areas. A case in point is that the working duration of most commercial banks in the affected areas hit by Boko Haram bombings has been reduced from eight hours to three hours (Mohammed, 2012).

“In Maiduguri, Borno State, where the sect originated, the frequent bombings and clashes between Boko Haram and the security agents have weighed down seriously on the commercial and businesses activities in the city as many businesses have reportedly crumbled while many people have fled the state” (Okereocha ,2012). There is already a dichotomy in the north and south development in Nigeria. The poverty profile released by the National Bureau of Statistics (BDN) 2012 illustrates that there is the prevalence of poverty in the north as compared to the south. The Business Day newspaper predicted if the insecurity situation continues development in the northern part will remain static and the gap between the north and south will broaden further (BDN, 2012).

There has been an urgent need to reintegrate the victims of displacement, as well as the victims of the insurgency and some former members of Boko Haram. As has been noted earlier these necessitated efforts by the Nigerian government and non-governmental actors to engage in the on-going reintegration of victims into society. The large numbers of unemployed youth provide ready foot soldiers to the insurgents; hence the government has to ensure the provision of employment opportunities for these youth (Alfred, 2016). It is the assertion of this study that once the government is able to block all avenues for the future recruitment of unsuspecting youth into this notorious group, and necessary education and employment are provided, the role of the military will be minimised (Busari, Hanna, and Karimi, 2016).

4. Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on Frustration-Aggression (F-A) Hypothesis, commonly called the Frustration-Aggression (F-A) Theory, is a seminal theory in Psychology which has been used several times in other fields of study to explain aggressive human behaviour. Central to the Frustration-Aggression theory is the tenet that there is a causal relationship between frustration and aggression. This conviction of a nexus between frustration and aggression was first held by a group of Yale University psychologists, John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, Orval H. Mowrer and, Robert R Sears in their co-authored monograph: Frustration and Aggression (1939).

The theory was later revised by Neal E. Miller (1941) and Leonard Berkowitz (1969). Frustration to the Yale group is “an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behaviour sequence”. In other words, it is a situation where the attainment of a desired goal of a person or group of people is hindered. Succinctly, aggression is a “sequence of behaviour, the goal-response to which is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed” (Walker, 2012).

On insurgency, the Frustration-Aggression Theory gives an understanding that the spike in the terrorist attacks on education and the North-Eastern region of Nigeria is as a result of the frustration of the inability to achieve their personal goals: putting an end to Western education, foisting their personal Islamic religion on the people, unemployment and impoverishment of the locals (Gilbert, 2014).

Since the goal of being gainfully employed to meet basic human needs and lead a decent life, foist a personal type of religion on the people in the country and putting an end to Western education has been hampered over time, the locals have taken out their frustration aggressively on the citizenry and government institutions whom they claim are blocking their chances. While the Frustration-Aggression Theory lenses can only make the user see frustration as the root cause of the aggressive behaviour of the insurgents in the North East, Nigeria.

The theory assumed that, insurgency is manifested out of frustration on account of national political, religious and economic system. The theory properly created the analogy used within this research to explain the dynamics of insurgency. Frustration-aggression theory emphasizes the difference between

what people feel they want and the discrepancy however, marginal, between what is sought and what they get, the greater the violent reaction. In the face of these frustrated expectations, a group is most vulnerable to embark on violent destructive behaviour or be a ready army to be used to cause crisis (Berkwizt, 1963).

Central to this explanation is that aggression is the natural outcome of frustration. In a situation where the legitimate desires of an individual or group is denied either directly or by the indirect consequence of the way a society is structured, the feeling of frustration can compel such persons or group to express their anger through violence that is directed at those perceived to be responsible for their misfortune or others who are indirectly related to those frustrating their expectations. To these theorists, much terrorist behaviour is a response to frustration of various political, economic and personal needs or objectives. Frustration and alienation drive many to join “self-help” ethnic, religious, community or civic groups, some of which are hostile to the Nigerian state (ICG, 2014).

A terrorist act is frequently intended to elicit a response that will demonstrate the terrorist legitimate aspirations. According to Ogege, (2013), terrorism is caused by frustrated expectations and state of hopeless and sustained mainly by bad governance, corruption and pervasively weak institutional framework. Frustrations, lack of income and unemployment have prompted the youths in the northern Nigeria to become foot soldiers of Boko Haram.

The speculation became severely criticized on the grounds of theoretical stress and overgeneralization, restricting the scope of the speculation to establish its validity. For instance, the initial hypothesis failed to differentiate different forms of aggression, wherein the actor’s goal is to inflict damage and instrumental styles of aggression, in which aggression is clearly mean to acquire other goals (which include manipulation or domination). This grievance can be dealt with as an alternative of confining the frustration-aggression speculation to instances of hostile aggression alone (Walker, 2012).

Critics additionally challenged the premise that any interference with on-going aim-directed behaviour would evoke frustration. According to the American psychologist Abraham Maslow and others, valid (or justified), interventions do not necessarily produce frustration. Only styles of interference that appear illegitimate (or arbitrary or in any other case

unjustified), they argued, should result in frustration (Williams et al, 2012).

5. Gaps in Literature

Over the decades, frustration–aggression theory has consistently been used in both basic and applied research despite several major shifts in aggression theories from a focus on biological drive to learned responses and environment–behaviour contingencies. When the strict behaviourist view was challenged in what has come to be known as the cognitive revolution-which led to a (re)discovery of cognitive antecedents of aggression and accompanying mental processes, such as aggressive intent, susceptibility to aggressive thinking, inclinations toward violence, hostile perception and attribution, and expectations regarding the outcome of aggressive behaviour (Przybylski et al., 2014).

The frustration–aggression hypotheses, again, was not discarded as out of date, but adapted and assimilated into the new psychological framework. Its reformulation by Berkowitz introduced another era of research on frustration and aggression by combining the cognitivist perspective with psychological theories of affect and emotion, further refining the theory’s value and practical implications.

In the assertion of Ibiang (2016), motivational psychologists have proposed alternative explanations to describe the mechanisms behind the causal link between frustrating events and aggressive outcomes. In spite of the constant changes to and refinements of its theoretical boundaries that characterize its development, the frustration–aggression hypothesis has been successfully applied to explain a wide range of behaviours in individuals, groups, and systems.

Eventually, a future fundamental change in psychological science might well cause yet another shift in its applications, and maybe even the falsification of some of its earlier predictions, it is safe to say that the empirical discoveries within the frustration–aggression framework have greatly advanced the understanding of human aggression and will continue to do so (Whitaker et al., 2013).

6. Critical Analysis of Insurgency in the North-East Nigeria

Boko Haram's origin is traceable to the 1990's when its pioneer leader Abu Yusuf Mohammed Yusuf, popularly known as Mohammed Yusuf led a radical Salafist Islamic youth group called Shababul Islam

meaning Islamic Youth Vanguard (ICG, 2014). Researchers generally hold the view that it was formally established in 2002 with the name Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, meaning "people Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". However, the name Boko Haram is derived from the Hausa language which means that "Western education is sin" and this name was given to them by the populace, due to their rejection of western education, the teachings and criticism of their leaders against societal ills supposedly orchestrated by western education. According to them, since western education 'boko' has been a harbinger of corruption and the socio-economic cum political societal inequalities, it must be forbidden 'haram' by true Muslims (Sergie and Johnson, 2014; ICG, 2014).

Therefore, it is based on this religious ideological stance that Boko Haram aspires to establish an Islamic state and Sharia laws in Northern Nigeria in particular and Nigeria in general. By 2003, the group had enlarged and started having brushes with security agencies due to their unlawful proclivities, which was accentuated by their varied linkages to the same political class they originally set out to criticize and condemn (ICG, 2014; Onuoha, 2012). This continued through 2004 and the refusal of the Nigerian state to nip their activities in the bud endeared them to several youths and thus, made their recruitment drive highly successful. However, in 2009, cognizant of the subversive tendencies of the group, the Bauchi state government restricted them from public preaching and further recruitment of converts. Already enraged, they characteristically disobeyed the motorbike helmet law and in an attempt by Nigerian security forces to compel obedience from them, a major conflict crisscrossing four States (Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe) ensued (Onuoha, 2012:58). The fight and riots lasted for five days until Boko Haram was eventually overpowered by the Nigerian military in Maiduguri, Yusuf was arrested, detained and he died in police custody. And it was recorded that between 700 and 800 of his members also died (Sergie and Johnson, 2014; Meehan and Speier, 2010).

From all appearances, Boko Haram insurgency could not be annihilated or even caged by the Nigerian state due to its obvious international dimensions. The transformation from a "machete-wielding mob" (Zenn, 2013) to a more organized one with armoured personnel carriers, fleet of SUVs, convoy of Hilux jeeps and possession of an assortment of sophisticated weaponry is only an indication of the fact that Boko Haram has access to financial and

logistical support outside the shores of Nigeria. Evidently, the group has established links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from where it has received advanced training and monetary support for its strategic insurgent activities in Nigeria (ICG, 2014; Sergie and Johnson, 2014; Zenn, 2013). Various categories of "arms and ammunition surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), AK-47 assault rifles, etc., looted by rebel forces and mercenaries during the uprising in Libya have been acquired by terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and sold to Boko Haram and its splinter groups".

Furthermore, Boko Haram insurgents collaboratively fought with AQIM and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in northern Mali (Zenn, 2012). They thus have had access to the psychological motivation, ideological inspiration, technological exposure (handling of Improvised Explosive Devices - IEDs), military training, logistical facilities, financial empowerment and perhaps, personnel of these fundamentalist Islamic groups.

The porosity of Nigeria's border also facilitates the fluidity and movement of members of the group from one neighbouring country to another. Abubakar Shekau for example reportedly fled to Gao in northern Mali with a thigh wound after he was almost caught by security forces on 24 September, 2012. Consequently, Nigerian troops were deployed to Mali in 2013 to collaboratively fight with French forces and flush out MUJAO and other jihadist Islamic groups, including Boko Haram in northern Mali (ICG, 2014).

Szrom and Harnisch (2011; cited in Gourley, 2012: 8-9) posited that for Al-Qaeda to operate effectively in any environment, the following conditions must be prevalent: "underdevelopment, incompetent governance, and a citizenry disenfranchised by or disillusioned with the central government an environment conducive to Al-Qaeda's presence and operations must also have a history of radical Islamism that Al-Qaeda operatives can exploit". Nigeria fulfils virtually all the aforementioned negative parameters necessary for the operation of a colossal and global terrorist outfit like al-Qaeda and this is made possible through the nexus it (Al-Qaeda) has established with Boko Haram. Shekau has not hidden his linkage to Al-Qaeda as he showers encomiums on Osama Bin Laden in most of his video clips (Zenn, 2013). Also, the use of suicide bombers

was hitherto, alien to the group until after their training in Somalia by Al-Shabaab (an Al-Qaeda affiliated group) in 2011.

The obvious nexus between Boko Haram and other international fundamentalist Islamic groups especially Al-Qaeda has equally strengthened various countries within the international system to express solidarity with the Nigerian state and designate Boko Haram a terrorist group. For example, the United States of America (US) designated the group a foreign terrorist organization on November 13, 2013. Britain also proscribed the group and on 22 May, 2014, the United Nations Security Council Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee formally included Boko Haram as one of the groups subject to financial and arms sanctions globally. By virtue of this inclusion in the sanctions list, anyone or corporate organization that supports Boko Haram financially, through provision of arms and/or by the supply of personnel has committed an offence against the global community. Members of the group are also banned from international travels - they cannot freely travel from one country to another without being arrested. Furthermore, the US has deployed eighty military personnel with drone military facilities to assist Nigeria in search of over two hundred girls kidnapped by Boko Haram on 14 April, 2014.

In addition, the French President, Francois Hollande hosted an unprecedented regional security summit in Paris for leaders of Nigeria's neighbouring countries and some international stakeholders to fashion out pragmatic collaborative strategies aimed at checkmating and possibly, annihilating the Boko Haram insurgency. Present at the summit were: President Paul Biya of Cameroon, President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger, Republic, President Boni Yayi of Benin and President Idriss Derby of Chad. Other stakeholders and friends of the Nigerian state present at the summit tagged "Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria" were, Britain, the European Union and the US. Britain has also deployed three teams of specialized advisers with a Royal Air Force (RAF) surveillance aircraft to help search, locate and rescue the over 200 school girls abducted by Boko Haram in Chibok, Nigeria. Similarly, China and Israel have indicated interest to assist in the search and rescue mission. Glaringly, the Boko Haram insurgency that started as a local Nigerian conflict has assumed international dimensions from various perspectives (ICG, 2014).

7. Critical Analysis of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the North-East, Nigeria

Nigeria as a country has witnessed its share of conflicts and disasters, leading to recovery efforts. A current prolonged and debilitating conflict is the on-going Boko Haram Conflict, which had led to disruptions in social and communal relationships; destruction of physical structures such as places of worship both mosques and churches; homes; offices; educational institutions and social infrastructures as well. Some of the impacts of conflict on the socio-economic and political development of North-Eastern Nigeria may include the following:

7.1 Disruptions in Community and Family Cohesion

Boko Haram activities have led to the dislocation of many families as many communities had literally fled their ancestral lands and have become Internally Displaced Persons within Nigeria while many have fled to neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. According to UNICEF (2015), an estimated 800,000 children have been forced to flee their homes as a result of the conflict in North-eastern Nigeria between Boko Haram, military forces and civilian self-defence groups.

In this trend, it is believed that there are currently 2,184,254 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) identified in 447,628 households. This signifies a 1.6% increase as recorded as against the year 2020. It is in the same vein that UNICEF (2021) reported that, children are the hardest hit, being vulnerable and dependent on their parents and communities for care and nurture, the attacks on their communities make them even much more vulnerable to illnesses, lack of nourishment, and deprivation of education amongst others.

In line with the above, Ujomu (2001) posits that: Children are bearing the brunt of this crisis, experiencing unimaginable violence and horrors no child should ever be subjected to. Most disturbingly, children and young people have been very deliberately put in the crosshairs with targeted attacks on schools, mass abductions and even reports of children being forced to carry bombs strapped to their bodies for public detonation. These grave violations of children's rights must be stopped immediately" (Ujomu, 2001). A region that experiences protracted conflict will also often suffer from economic underdevelopment, damaged assets, and a reduced capacity to function effectively. Armed conflict

retards a country's development process, and also erodes its developmental foundation.

7.2 Material and Economic Losses

In addition to the huge loss of lives, war leads to material losses, such as destruction of crops and roads, and extensive damage to economic and social infrastructures. Transportation and communication system, banking, health care, education, and agriculture are often damaged or destroyed. The economic stress caused by war lessens production capacity and limits the investment capabilities of war-torn regions. During wartime, resources are "diverted from routine maintenance of existing social and economic infrastructure" and into defence. Non-military government spending is often tightened, and there is typically a decline in investments in industrial, agricultural and construction sectors. These industries, as well as overall trade, tend to decline. Debt often reaches very high levels (Sheriff, 2015).

7.3 Emigration and Displacement of Persons

War can also lead to emigration and displacement, which can reduce the overall size of the labour force (Segovia, 1996). People are killed, or they abandon their homes. This can create significant costs for a country in terms of capital and labour power.

7.4 Decrease in Skilled Manpower

Human resource shortages are also often severe in war-torn societies. Educational opportunities decrease, and access to land can be limited. Indeed, war-induced destruction and poverty can lead to illiteracy, malnutrition, inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities, and low school enrolment (Udounwa, 2013). Protracted conflict disrupts the routine life of many society members. These burdens may contribute to harsh economic or social conditions, pitting subgroups against each other. In severe cases, it produces social disorder resulting in widespread violence, famine, and flight (Zohrabi, 2013). This has been witnessed in the North East as skilled, educated manpower have fled the region to more conducive zones and states. Since the main grouse of the insurgents has to do with Western education, the skilled and educated persons, being the focus of attacks moving away, further depletes the already insufficient and inadequate skills set of the zone.

7.5 Environmental Degradation

The environmental degradation brought about by war is also extensive. War-related population movements wreak havoc on fragile ecosystems and natural resources are over-exploited to finance the war effort (Udounwa, 2013). Land mines particularly in the Sambisa and other main forested areas make territory unusable for agriculture. Following the resolution of the armed conflict, it is expected that multiple claims to land and assets arise, and are difficult to resolve in the contentious political environment that typically follows conflict.

8. Efforts at Reconstructing and Rehabilitation of the North-East:

The development of physical and financial infrastructure, as well as investment in human capital and natural resources, are crucial to post war economic reconstruction. After armed conflict has come to an end, parties face the difficult task of re-establishing and developing the political, social, and economic structures within society. Indeed, states emerging from armed conflict face the difficult challenge of transitioning from "war-weakened economies and highly polarized political and social relations to rejuvenated economies capable of providing the basic needs of all citizens and political groups that offer all social groups meaningful participation" in decision-making (Ball, 2000). An essential component of peace building is the rebuilding of economic institutions, government institutions, and communities (Higazi, 2013).

However, it was revealed that the major responses to the conflict have been coming from the Federal Government of Nigeria through different agencies, Borno State Government, Other State Governments, which channel their support through the Borno State Government, the United Nations, largely through UNICEF and religious bodies and institutions. The major efforts have been in the provision of relief, such as food items, clean water, hygiene items, clothing, temporary accommodation and other necessities (Boehler, 2015).

The Federal Government of Nigeria has the following Agencies and Committees responding and providing relief to the citizens of the North East:

- I. National Emergency Management Agency – NEMA
- II. Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE)
- III. Presidential Committee on Distribution of Relief Materials
- IV. Victims Support Fund

V. Safe School Initiative

VI. Special Committee on the Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the IDPs (Simeon, 2012).

The interventions being carried out by the different Committees are highlighted below as reported by Sheriff and Ipinmoye (2015):

(a) National Emergency Management Agency:

The agency has been active and consistent in providing relief to internally displaced persons. There are over 20 IDPs camps across the northern part of the country.

NEMA had been providing the following relief services:

- Deployed ambulances at strategic locations to support and evacuate victims to hospitals and to provide first aid”.
- Provided comprehensive humanitarian support to 3,200 IDPs from Baga at its secure facility at Teachers Camp, Maiduguri”.
- Sewing of 5 sets of new garments for women and children rescued from Sambisa Forest.
- Registering and transporting 11,499 returnees from Niger Republic to their home states.
- Setting up and maintaining feeding and sanitation centres in IDP Camps.
- Partnering with bilateral and multilateral agencies, US Govt and others in providing relief to the IDPs.
- Providing psychosocial support and counselling for 275 women and children rescued from Sambisa Forest by the Armed Forces.
- Presenting Relief Materials to refugees.
- Conducting sensitization meetings with the Armed Forces.
- Supporting the provision of educational materials and schooling by the Kano State Government to Orphans and IDPs (Sheriff and Ipinmoye, 2015).

(b) Presidential Initiative for the North East:

This was launched by President Jonathan’s Representative, the Minister of Power Alhaji Mohammed Wakil on November 14, 2014. The Federal Government deployed more troops and resources that helped to ensure that the occupied

towns are recaptured, A Marshall Plan for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and redevelopment of the area was to be unveiled as soon as the insurgents are driven out of the area. (Information Nigeria Online News, 2014 Nov 15).

News Agency of Nigeria (2015) reported that the Presidential Initiative for the North-East in collaboration with National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), has distributed relief materials to over 100,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the zone.

(c) Presidential Committee on Flood Relief and Rehabilitation:

This agency had signed a N5 billion contract for the construction of rehabilitation centres for survivors of flood disasters, communal clashes and insurgency in some parts of the country (Voice of Nigeria, 2014, July 17).

(d) The Borno State Government:

The Government of Borno State had taken significant steps in providing Relief, which was done through the Food for all Initiatives, wherein 2000 households in Bayo and Kwaya Kusar Local Government Areas of Southern Borno State had so far benefited from assorted food items. In addition to the relief efforts state wide, the State Government had taken the following initiatives on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.

(e) Reconstruction of destroyed towns and communities

This has been done with 432 units of houses completed for victims of insurgency of Bulabulin - Ngarnam community in Maiduguri. New housing units have also been built and delivered in Bama, Konduga, Gwoza, Yoyo in Monguno, some parts of Hawul, Kaga, to resettle victims of insurgency attacks. Schools, markets and hospitals have been rebuilt in local government areas.

(f) United Nations Support: through UNICEF:

The United Nations provides counselling and psychosocial support to over 60,000 children affected by the conflict in Nigeria. UNICEF is also working with partners to provide safe water and life-saving health services, restore access to education by creating temporary learning spaces and deliver

therapeutic treatment to malnourished children (Higazi, 2013).

(g) United Nations Support: Integrated Support Package:

According to, the UN Integrated Support Package (ISP) For North East Nigeria, the United Nations Initiative is worth \$59,138,367.00 and is aimed at providing all necessary support for ensuring that the rescued women, young girls and children receive all social, health, psychological and other related support before they re-join their communities. Further support will be provided to ensure that their livelihoods and communities are restored as early as possible. (Musonda, 2015).

(h) Food Assistance Programs: United States:

The United States Government, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Food for Peace (FFP) initiated an emergency food assistance project for food insecurity in Yobe and Gombe States. The Food for Peace Project is being done in partnership with Action against Hunger (AAH), Mercy Corps, and the American University of Nigeria, Yola to provide emergency food assistance to vulnerable, conflict-affected populations in north-eastern Nigeria. The project targets 3,000 households in Yobe and 4,100 households in Gombe and aims to increase purchasing power to meet immediate food needs, increase dietary diversity, protect livelihoods of displaced persons and host community members, and prevent the risk of malnutrition in children. FFP supports unconditional cash transfers, food vouchers and nutritional sensitization, targeting the most vulnerable populations, including IDPs, pregnant and lactating women, female-headed households, and households with a child under five (NEMA, 2015).

(i) United States in partnership with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Nigeria:

Safe Schools in the Northeast: According to the USAID, the transfer of a \$2 million donation by the U.S. government to support Nigeria's Safe Schools Initiative a project aimed at meeting the education needs of thousands of children affected by the ongoing conflict in northeast Nigeria, specifically in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. The UNDP will manage a multi-donor trust fund to support the Safe Schools Initiative. The Safe Schools Initiative will manage school-based interventions, such as the

improvement or refurbishment of infrastructure and furnishings, provision of teaching and learning materials, community-based preventative planning, and support for double-shift scheduling to accommodate more students. Activities under the initiative include increasing the resilience of affected communities and building the capacity of children, teachers, and parents to prevent, reduce, and cope with challenging situations that affect children's education. Other aspects include multi-level communication/advocacy efforts and special measures, such as transferring students from schools in "high-risk areas" to schools in safer areas (Sheriff and Ipinmoye, 2015).

9. Modules of Reconstruction in the North-East, Nigeria

The North East region of Nigeria, comprising of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba States, has been ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency since 2009. Estimates of the negative impacts of the crisis include approximately 14.8 million people adversely affected, about 2.3 Million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), including over 177 thousand Nigerian Refugees in neighbouring countries, over 20 thousand deaths and even more people severely injured or missing. Many of the region's residents now live in IDP camps, with host families away from their original homes and in host communities. Many host communities are severely stressed, having to cater for the large influx of displaced people from places directly hit by Boko Haram (Sheriff and Ipinmoye, 2015).

The Boko Haram crisis has also resulted in extensive damage to social, economic, health and market infrastructure. Numerous homes have been destroyed. Many schools, hospitals, markets and places of worship have been destroyed or closed. Many communities have been completely abandoned, especially in Borno and Yobe States. There are limited numbers of teachers, doctors and other health workers, with over 500 teachers killed and many fleeing the region. While there is still a semblance of economic activity in some parts of the region, the economy of the region has virtually collapsed, with many parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, having lost key markets and other market-related infrastructure. Returning the region to normalcy is one of the highest priorities of the Nigerian Government. Achieving this will require bringing an end to the war, effectively handling the humanitarian crisis and implementation of an effective rehabilitation and resettlement programme. It will

require the implementation of a solid peace-building, reconciliation and de-radicalisation framework; as well as the effective reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure.

Finally, the region will require the successful implementation of a development strategy that leverages advanced knowledge of post conflict redevelopment strategy, the commitment of the Private Sector, the support of International Development Partners and Local Partners such as the Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). Returning the region to normalcy will also require a clear funding strategy, strong and accountable Governance and Institutional Frameworks, a rigorous Monitoring & Evaluation Framework and an effective Communication Strategy. 'Rebuilding the North East' (The Buhari Plan) is a harmonised plan for achieving all of the above. The harmonised Plan seeks to have one integrated planning document and framework that will serve as the national road map for all interventions in the North East. In completing this plan, the following existing planning documents, assessments and reports developed by all the region's Stakeholders were reviewed as foundations, as asserted by Sheriff and Ipinmoye (2015), as follows:

- The Presidential Initiative of the North East (PINE) Short-term Emergency Assistance and Economic Stabilisation (EA-ES2014), Intermediate-term Resettlement and Rehabilitation (RRR 2015) and the Long-Term Economic Reconstruction and Redevelopment Plan (ERR 2015) in collaboration with several Government Ministries, Department and Agencies.
- The North East States Transformation Strategy (NESTS) by the Governors of the 6 Constituent States, in collaboration with the North East Economic Summit Group (NEESG).
- The 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).
- The 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) by the United Nations Organisation for Humanitarian Coordination and Assistance (UNOCHA).
- The 2016 Protection Monitoring Report (PMR) by the United Nation Human Rights Commission (UN-HRC).

- The 2016 Nigeria Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).
- The Educational Interventions in the North East Report by the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI).
- The 2016 Victim Support Fund (VSF) Programme Document.
- The 2016 Sustainable Peace-building Strategy (SPBS) by the National Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR).
- The 2015 Resettlement Framework (RF) developed by the National Commission for Refugees (NCR).
- The 2016 North East Health Sector Humanitarian Crisis Response Strategic Plan (HS-HCRSP) by the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH).
- The 2014 Countering Violent Terrorism (CVE) Plan of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).
- Several other proposals, plans, reports and assessments of Government Ministries Departments and Agencies as submitted.
- The 2016 Nigeria Peace-building and Recovery Assessment (RPBA) by the UN, EU, World Bank, USAID, DFID and others. Thus, in 'Rebuilding the North East', the Humanitarian Assistance, Social Stabilisation and Early Recovery sections (Volume 1) derives largely from the 2016 HRP, the 2014 EA-ES and the relief efforts of the many International Humanitarian Actors; the Rehabilitation, Relocation and Resettlement sections (Volume II) is a product of the 2015 RRR.

10. Conclusion

From the critical analysis of literature related to reconstruction and rehabilitation in the North-East, it can be concluded that returning the region to normalcy will also require a clear funding strategy, strong and accountable Governance and Institutional Frameworks, a rigorous Monitoring & Evaluation Framework and an effective Communication Strategy. It was also discovered that the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the North-East Nigeria have not been rehabilitated into their various communities till date, the reconstruction of the social amenities have not yet properly started, it is not the responsibility of NGOs, individuals, religious bodies and the security to engage in reconstruction and rehabilitation but rather it is the responsibility of the

government. It was discovered that children are the hardest hit, being vulnerable and dependent on their parents and communities for care and nurture, the attacks on their communities make them even much more vulnerable to illnesses, lack of nourishment, and deprivation of education amongst others. In addition to the huge loss of lives, war leads to material losses, such as destruction of crops and roads, and extensive damage to economic and social infrastructures. Transportation and communication system, banking, health care, education, and agriculture are often damaged or destroyed. The economic stress caused by war lessens production capacity and limits the investment capabilities of war-torn regions. During wartime, resources are “diverted from routine maintenance of existing social and economic infrastructure” and into defence.

The conclusion also shows that the records of damages are not known and also the record of damages are inflated, reveals that government, NGOs, international organisations and religious bodies are stakeholders to compensation process of those affected by insurgency, extra judicial killings and summary executions of civilians by the insurgence are wrongly reported and bias, that Boko Haram sect and religious bodies are the perpetrators of the illegal and unlawful termination of innocent civilian lives and there are cases of human rights violations like rape, torture and other forms of brutality in the insurgency activities

11. Recommendations

Based on this, it is recommended that:

Social and basic amenities destroyed in communities across the North-East Region of Nigeria by activities of terrorism masterminded by Boko Haram should be reconstructed as soon as possible. This is necessary to ameliorate the hardship people are facing in the region due to acute shortage of social and basic amenities in several communities in the region. Sources of water supply, dispensaries and maternity centres destroyed in several communities should be rebuilt. Several connecting roads and bridges were damaged by Boko Haram to make accessibility to several communities difficult for the government forces. Those roads and bridges should be repair to create easy access and connectivity among the various communities in the region. Several public or general hospitals in some of the areas captured by Boko Haram and which were used by the Insurgents mostly as camps and treatment centres have been destroyed by the Terrorists as they were fleeing from

such places. There is urgent need to reconstruct those hospitals so as to make access to health care possible for IDPs returning back home. Local Government Secretariats have been attacked and burnt to ashes by Boko Haram Terrorists in several local government headquarters. Civic institutions like governmental departments, courts, police stations and outpost as well as private and public financial institutions like banks and micro-finance centres were also destroyed by Boko Haram in several communities. Public schools and even private ones in some cases have been reduced to rubbles and ashes by Boko Haram. Those facilities should be reconstructed to give people especially IDPs returning back home a new face of life to start all over again. The North-East Development Commission (NEDECO) bill recently passed by Nigerian National Assembly and assented by the President is expected to among other objectives participate actively in the reconstruction of damaged facilities and come up with new ones where necessary in the North-East Region. The Presidency should endeavour to ensure that fund accrue to the commission is utilized appropriately in the development of the region.

Although, complains are high that the government cannot specially state the actual figure of civilian lives and properties destroyed by the insurgency. This is because of the belief that several summary execution and extra-judicial killings of civilians and also some civilian casualties recorded in some of the cross fire between the conflicting parties were not recorded. These claims are actually hard to deny or refute because the insurgency brought about scenarios with features of several civilians’ casualties which were not actually recorded. But then, for those which records are available, necessary preparations must be made to compensate families of innocent civilians unlawfully killed in the insurgency. Those whose properties were mistakenly or deliberately destroyed in pursuance of fleeing Terrorists should also be compensated. Several houses, shops full of goods, cars, Lorries, etc. were destroyed in the cause of searching and chasing the Terrorists. Their owners should be compensated as soon as possible. This will ameliorate the suffering and economic difficulty the families of innocent civilians killed by the insurgency are going through. The compensation will also give those whose shops and businesses were destroyed a new face of life and capital base to start their businesses all over again.

Independent judicial panel of inquiry is not only needed but should be established by the Nigerian government to investigate cases of abduction, torture of civilians, rape, extra-judicial killings and summary

executions in the insurgency. Aggrieved families of innocent civilians summarily executed or killed extra-judiciously should forward complain and demand justice for their death relatives killed unlawfully in the insurgency. Civilians who were also tortured should be given the privilege to lodge complains before the panel of inquiry. Those who were apprehended, tortured and put to detention without trial for allegedly been accused as Boko Haram members should be allowed to file complains before the panel especially for torture, unlawful detention and deformation of character. Victims of rape and other form of brutality should also have opportunity to lodge complains before the panel. The panel's findings and recommendations should be implemented by the government. The panel should recommend to the government cases in which perpetrators should be liable for prosecution in the court of law and those which victims are entitled to compensation. This correction of injustices encountered in the insurgency will go a long way in quenching the grievances on the minds of the people in North-East Region who believe that justice has not been done to them in relation to the violation of their fundamental human rights in the insurgency.

And finally, there is need for the Nigerian authority to not only find out who the sponsor (s) of Boko Haram is or are. But to also make sure that if discovered, such person (s) should be apprehended and brought to justice to face the full wrath of law so as to serve as deterrent to others nurturing similar ambition of destabilizing national security.

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