



## The Political Murder of a Theocratic Leader, Muhammad Yusuf: Boko Haram's *Jihadist*-Inspired Uprising in Nigeria

IBRAHIM BRAJI

Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria

**Abstract.** This paper is a critical study of Boko Haram's strategy of avenging the killing of its leader, Muhammed Yusuf, while under the custody of the Nigerian Police Force on July 30, 2009, in Maiduguri, Borno State, and the pursuit of its jihadist agenda. This specific killing turned a relatively peaceful religious propagandizing group into one of the most brutal and deadly in the world. Boko Haram's transformation from a peaceful religious activity to a violent anti-establishment movement led to the widespread killing of security forces and innocent citizens through suicide bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and the destruction of properties worth billions of Naira. Initially, the security personnel, whom the group identified as responsible for the death of its leader, were the main target before the uprising expanded into a "holy war" consuming the whole nation. Boko Haram's strategy is an unislamic offshoot of the ideas of jihadist scholars, who propagated extremist religious tenets for the transformation of society into an Islamic one. This has not been studied in depth by scholars and commentators, who have rather paid more attention to the insurgents' historical origins, foreign allies, support and open battle with the Nigerian military. The insurgents' bombing of security facilities, markets, mosques, schools, and churches led to the deaths of many and the destruction of property. Such a misguided strategy, which is the outcome of the influence of jihadist scholars' sermons transmitted through legends, books, social media outlets and lectures, has led to the loss of lives, a high number of deserters and demoralized the security forces, and put fear in the minds of citizens, leading to mass migration and the setting up of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, *Almajiri*, Revivalism, *Jihad*, Suicide Bombing and Terrorism.

### 1. Introduction

Scholars and commentators have discussed the historical roots and rebellion of Boko Haram from a variety of perspectives, including origin and ideology (de Montclos, 2014; Montzikos, 2010; Bukarti, 2020); economy (Familusi, 2018); religious belief (Agbiboa, 2003; Smith, 2015; Ibrahim et al. (eds.), 2017; Thurston, 2018); foreign relationship (Karmon, 2014; Connell, 2012); and violent disposition (Mainaagwa, 2013, Mantzikos, 2013, Walker, 2016, Salihi, 2012; Bakare, 2009; Hines, 2009; Ibrahim, 1998; Hentz, 2018). Despite the group's almost two decades of existence as a terrorist movement, "arguably so much remains unknown about its past all the way to its present" Adedeji (2021:5). To our knowledge, no one believes that Muhammad Yusuf's murder while a prisoner of the police and foreign *jihadist* scholars' *fatwa* (sermons) and literature are the major contributory factors in the transition of the group into extremism, fanaticism and violence. The transformation of a rather peaceful religious movement into an extremist, ultra-radicalized and violent one requires the existence of "a smoking gun," such as the resentment kindled by real or perceived injustice (Sageman, 2005) or the murder of the leader of the group, Muhammad Yusuf, by the security forces and the frustration and desperation of the group against the Nigerian State.

Displaying Yusuf's bullet-ridden body to the press on July 30, 2009 led the group to form an open, organized religious-political movement opposing state structural violence and existence. It evolved from a loose organization into a structured and hierarchical one that was encircled by religious fervor and the desire for retribution against the culprits, the Nigerian Police Force initially and the Nigerian State in general. In

order to exact revenge on the state for the wrongs done to it, for the murder of its leaders and followers and promote the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, it turned to violence and physical force rather than continuing with its initial strategy of quietly spreading its religious ideology. Since that incident, Boko Haram has become increasingly militant and militarized, as a result of its evolving view of violence as the core tenet of its conflict with the authorities.

Yusuf's corpse was never returned to his family for burial and even those who attempted to retrieve the body, such as his in-law, Baba Fugu, were eliminated in the process. He was buried in a mass grave with some of his followers at an unidentified site. This decision by the government may have been motivated by the apprehension that Yusuf's grave could end up being used as a shrine or a rallying point by his supporters for future uprisings.

Thus, Yusuf suffered the same fate as other *jihadists* and anti-establishment and revolutionary leaders, such as Che Guevara, Patrice Lumumba, Muhammed Marwa Maitatsine, Osama Bin Laden, and Muammar Gaddafi. Maitatsine led a religious uprising in Kano and was killed and cremated by the security on December 18, 1980 (Braji, 1998) and Hiskett, (1987). Che Guevara, a communist revolutionary, was executed, dismembered and buried in a mass grave in Bolivia on October 9, 1967 (Ratner and Smith (2011) and Castañeda (1998). Patrice Lumumba, an elected Prime Minister, was killed and burned to ashes with two of his Ministers in the Democratic Republic of Congo on January 17, 1961 (De Witte, (2001), Robert (1971) and Robin (1969). Osama Bin Laden was hunted and killed by the United States (US) Marines in Pakistan on May 2, 2010, and his corpse buried in the northern Arabian Sea (Bowden, 2012; Hersh, 2017) and Muammar Gaddafi was killed in Sirti, Libya, on October 20, 2011 and buried in an undisclosed location in the desert with his son, Mutassim, and his Military Chief, Abu Bakr Younes (Netto, 2014; and Davidson, 2017). These individuals share the same fate with Muhammad Yusuf and ended without a marked gravesite for fear that such a luxury may rally support and instigate an uprising against the system.

### 1.1 *Ustaz* Muhammad Yusuf Background

The area under the daily attacks of Boko Haram was the first to come into contact with Islam around the second half of the 7th century through travelers, traders and scholars in central and western Sudan (Zanna, 1993; Shehu, 2018). The contact shaped the socio-economic and political setup of the region. The conversion of the traditional rulers, the *Mais*, such as

*Mai* Bulu, *Mai* Aiku, *Mai* Kadi and *Mai* Umme, led to their dominance and expansion within the Kanem-Borno empire and neighboring territories covering the entire Lake Chad Basin. The area was known for its Islamic knowledge, literature and culture. Renowned scholars and jurists, such as Sheikh Al-Bakari, Sheikh al-Najib al-Takiddawi, Sheikh Abu Bakar Al-Bakumi, Sheikh Tahir bn Ibrahim and Sheikh Tahir, flourished and taught the religion to the local people (Yusuf, 2016). However, Islamic scholarship is embodied in struggle to follow and return to authentic tenets and the abandonment of non-Islamic practices. Thus, schisms within Muslims have been a daily occurrence for decades, with many sects, such as *Qaddriyya*, *Tijjaniyya*, *Shi'a*, *Ahmadiyya*, *Qur'aniyyun*, *Muhammadiyyu* and *Sufism* and *Ahla Sunnah* or the *Salafist*, struggling to have more adherents in the area. This is not surprising, as the roots of revivalism are part and parcel of the traditional learning system of the religion in the region, where thoughts and ideas are changed from intellectual differences into physical ones. The region and its neighboring areas have been witnessing numerous Islamic revivalist movements for centuries. A good example is *Mai* Dunama Dabbalemi, who reigned in Kanem Borno from 1210 and 1259 and waged a *jihad* against the surrounding tribes, thereby incorporating and expanding the influence and reach of the religion. The 14th-century rise to power of Sultan Ali Yaji of Kano after the battle of Santolo led to the transformation of the Hausa Kingdom into an Islamic Sultanate around 1359–1385. Thus, Islam and Islamic revivalism had been part of the history of these areas even before the arrival and propagation of the religion by Usman Dan Fodio and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. It is, therefore, wrong to have asserted that Dan Fodio's 1804 *jihad* was the first seed of Islamic uprising in Northern Nigeria. It is, however, true to say that the 1804 Sokoto revivalism is more studied for its reformist agenda against polytheism in Northern Nigeria and for the establishment of a theocratic state, the Sokoto Caliphate. Usman Dan Fodio, an Islamic cleric, used the religion to recruit the peasantry who had been under the exploitation and corrupt system of Habe Kings. The Sheikh succeeded in uprooting the Habe hereditary system of governance and substituting it with another under his lineage, the Fulani (Phillips, (2017). Nevertheless, the *Mais* of the Kanem-Borno Empire had Islamized most parts of Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin area for decades before Dan Fodio's uprising. Despite this cementation, the areas had witnessed violent uprisings led by Islamic fundamentalists, such as Malam Dubaba (alias Sheriff ad-Din), who declared war against Baghirmi; Malam Ibrahimu (the 1870 uprising in Kano); Hayatu bin Said (1878–1898), a *Mahdist*

opponent of the Sokoto Caliphate, who waged war against the Shehu of Borno with the help of a rebel, Rabeah Zubayr; Alfa Saibu or Shuaibu Dan Makaho (of the uprising of 1906 in Dosso, Niger region); Malam Isa (a *Mahdi* rebel of 1914); Miji-n-Aoun of Katsina (1927) and the 1967 revolt of Youra Bourdon from Ladou of South Geidam, Yobe State (de Montclos, 2021). The most recent were Annabin (Prophet of) Doko (a town in the present Jigawa State), the Maitatsine uprising in Kano in 1980, Kaduna and Bulunkutu in 1982 and Yola in 1984, the Kala-Kato crisis in Bauchi in 1985 and Muhammad Ali's Kanamma uprising in 2003 (Adesoji, 2010, Braji, (1998) and Walker, 2016).

Thus, under this atmosphere and culture, Yusuf was born and grew up. His life-history is shrouded in confusion, from his date of birth to his struggle for Islamic knowledge and relationship with diverse sectarian scholars in the northern part of Nigeria. He is a Yobe State native on both his father and mother's sides. His father was from Jakusko and his mother from Gashua, although he was born in Girgi, a village in Jakusko Local Government, Yobe State, North Eastern Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. Girgi is an agricultural rural settlement populated by farmers and herders in Jakusko Local Government. Thus, farming and animal husbandry are the key features of the area's economy. It is one of the most impoverished parts of the state. The village is populated by a conservative Muslim community committed to practicing the *Almajiranci* system of education. The system is the traditional and non-formal means of educating children in Islam and Qur'anic knowledge under the guidance and supervision of a Qur'anic *Mallam* (cleric) (Edinyang et al., (2020); Abdulgadic, (2003) and Zubairu and Yahaya, (2020). Thus, Yusuf, as expected, was raised under the influence of the *Almajiri* system, which has been dominant in northeastern Nigeria. He moved with one *mallam* after the other, thereby traversing from one itinerant *mallam* and *Almajiri Tsangaya* (schools) to another as the system allowed.

Thus, historically and culturally, the area where Yusuf was born and grew up, as stated above, falls within the ancient kingdom of the Kanem-Borno Empire famous for its rooted *Sunni* Islamic tradition (Monguno, 2017) and its role in the dissemination of knowledge, literature and scholarship for a long time. Islam reached the area around 665 and 666 AD through merchants and scholars from North Africa and became the state religion with the *Mais* (Kings/Rulers) and citizens believing in its practice and sanctity (Usman and Alkali (eds), (1983) and Shehu, (2018). The area became a sanctuary for those seeking knowledge and

was referred to as "the East" (*Gabas*) by the surrounding communities. Thus, it is a region that saw the emergence of "Islamic revivalist movements" under the persuasive conviction of the imminent apocalypse and the rise of the *Mahdi* (Islamic Reformer) (Brakoniecka, 2016; Thurston, 2016; and Sani, 2007). The myth very popular among scholars and the population was that a *Mahdi* will appear as a preacher of religious sermons and, as his followers increase in size and popularity, he will resort to arm struggle to establish a *Daula* (Caliphate) (Yusuf, 2016). *Mahdi* is to reform and strengthen the religion and the *Sunna* of Prophet Muhammad in the land.

As he matured in age and scholarship, Muhammed Yusuf began perambulating as the tradition of *almajiranci* from one renowned scholar or sect to another (Gari, 2017). Although a *Sunni* adherent, he, however, found himself with the *Shi'ite* sect under the leadership of an Iranian-inspired, influenced and funded group, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzakky (Hassan, 2015). The group believes in the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic state in Nigeria and acknowledges the authority and pledges its loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, and Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzakky only. IMN views itself as a government, with Sheikh El-Zakzakky as the only source of authority, leading it to have running battles with constituted authorities, the imprisonment of its leader in numerous prisons, the destruction of its properties and the killing of its followers, as recently witnessed under President Muhammadu Buhari's administration. The sect lost around 300 members between December 12 and 14, 2015 in its clash with the Nigerian Army (Tijani, 2015). Yusuf's affiliation with Sheikh El-Zakzakky was brief and disagreements with some of the Sheikh's ideas led him to join *Jama'atu Tajdidi Islam* (JTI), one of the sect's breakaway groups (Salaam, 2013). The *Al-Thaqalayn* Cultural Foundation and the *Rasulul A'azam* Foundation are two other notable *Shi'ite* factions in Nigeria that oppose El-Zakzkay and the IMN's ideology and propagation techniques. Yusuf, on the other hand, could not remain with JTI and its brand of *Shi'ism* for long and returned to the *Sunni* doctrine by joining and becoming a follower of *Jama'at Izalatil Bidia wa Iqamatus Sunnah* (in short: *Izala*) (translation: Society for the support of the Prophet's tradition and against innovations), the dominant and most influential popular Islamic movement in northern Nigeria.

Thus, throughout his sojourn in *Shi'ism*, there was a running battle in his mind between propagation, indoctrination and ideology. Being an ambitious

person, Yusuf realized early enough that Ibrahim El-Zakzaky was an institution within IMN whose authority could not be questioned or easily displaced. The sect has had a laid-down organizational and leadership structure in existence for decades inspired by the Iranian Revolution and changing such structures is impossible. His ambition for leadership and influence could not be easily achieved under such a scenario (Braj, 2023).

In contrast to the Shi'ites, the Sunni group has a loose structure. The group's origins in Nigeria may be traced back to the late Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, a prominent Islamic scholar and Grand Khadi of the then-northern Nigeria. The movement seeks to eradicate traditional, cultural and heretical developments in order to restore society to the true Prophet Muhammad paradigm. To establish a firm foundation in the religion, he joined *Ahl Sunna Wal Jama'ah Hijra*, a Maiduguri-based *Izala* group created in 1995 by a relatively unknown preacher, Abubakar Lawan (Oyegbile and Lawan, 2007). Seizing a vacuum created by Abubakar Lawan's relocation to Saudi Arabia for further studies in 2002, Yusuf catapulted himself to prominence as the leader with a large following, which could not have been possible in IMN or other *Shi'ite* groups. Yusuf ascending to the leadership was not smooth, as followers like Aminu Tashen Illimi opposed him for being too liberal (Gusau, 2009). *Izala*, on the other hand, provided him with the benefits of developing rapport with and receiving guidance from great *Sunni Salafist* Islamic scholars and members of the group, such as the late Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmud Adam and Sheikh Muhammad Auwal Albani, Sheikh Muhammad Abba Aji, Imam Ali Gabchiya, Sheikh Abubakar Mujahid (Kassim, 2015 and Braji, 2023), Sheikh Kabir Gombe and Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir. This allowed him to broaden his horizons and garner followers from Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Bauchi States, as well as neighboring nations like Niger, Mali, Chad and Cameroon.

Yusuf showed no signs of extremism, fanaticism or a violent temperament throughout the early stages of his development as a scholar. However, he was more of an ambitious personality, who established relationships with the authorities than someone set on usurping power in order to enforce the *Shari'a* or build a caliphate. He had a friendly demeanor and was eager to learn and share views with experts, such as Sheikh Muhammad Awwal Adam Albani or even debate with other religious intellectuals. One example is the debate he held with Sheikh Isa Ali Pantemi on June 25, 2006 (Abubakar, 2017, Cook, 2018i), which was aired, produced into films and sold all over, reaching thousands of people in their homes. This debate was

one of many conducted between 2004 and 2006 between him and other scholars, such as the one with Idris Abdul Aziz Bauchi in February 2008 (Mohammed, 2014).

However, as his ideas grew and his violent *jihadist* tendencies became more obvious, gaps appeared between him and the *Izala* scholars and political leaders in his home state of Borno. He and other young *Sunni* adherents were regular attendees of Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmud Adam's *tafsir* at Indimi Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State (Smith, 2016). Their connection soured when Yusuf began to diverge from authentic Islamic belief, which led to the death of Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmud Adam on April 13, 2007 while conducting the (Subh) morning prayers at Dorayi Juma'at Mosque in Kano (Brigaglia, 2012b), Zenn (2020) and Braji, 2023i). This killing is recognized to have been "carried out on the orders" of Muhammad Yusuf in response to his criticism of the group's hardline views on many Islamic issues (Walker, 2012:4).

He evolved from an *Izala* group member to the leader of an impending terrorist group named *Yusufiyya* (Fasure, 2009), but known globally as Boko Haram. However, the moniker Boko Haram is a crude representation of the group's opposition to the corruptive effect of Western culture on Muslim society. However, no leader of the group has ever referred to the religious movement as Boko Haram (translated: Westernization (Education) Is Sacrilege or Western Education is a Sin or Sinful). It is a name popularized, especially by the press worldwide.

However, the names preferred by the leadership and membership of the group are *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li-l Da'awah wa al-Jihad*, *Jama'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda' Awati Wal-Jihad* or *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna li'l-Da'wawa'l-Jihad 'ala Minhaj al-Salaf*, which translates as "People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and *Jihad*" or "The Association of the People of the *Sunna* (i.e., tradition of the Prophet) for Preaching and *Jihad* according to the *Salafi* Method". By claiming these names, the group can be categorized as a revivalist movement intending to reform the old entrenched traditional system in society to the genuine tenets of Islam.

By claiming these identities, the organization might be classified as a revivalist movement with the goal of reforming society's old entrenched conventional structure to the true fundamentals of Islam. *Yusufiyya* became a revivalist movement in search of regime change. Revivalism is a revolutionary movement that seeks to overthrow the existing system. Islamic

revivalism is an attempt to rediscover Islamic identity and heritage. It is a defensive tactic aimed at combating social vices, foreign influence and culture and domestic tyranny. Although it is not a unified movement, all Islamic revivalists share a common goal: the Islamization of society. Their techniques and emphases varied, depending to the era of existence, ideology and sectarianism, environment or the primary issue confronting society at the time of inception and development. Numerous scholars tried to strengthen Islam through peaceful means, while others preferred the outright destruction of the existing system through violence. Militant hardliners consider violent uprisings as the central means of cleansing the system by engaging in vicious extremism for the establishment of a new social order.

But revivalism through the use of violence is unislamic, as the religion abhors compulsion in religious matters. Verse 256 of Surat al-Baqara of the Holy Qur'an clearly states that "There is no compulsion in religion." Islam has evoked the idea that under no circumstances should a person be forced to accept the religion against his will. Based on this, it is erroneous to define *Jihad* as solely a holy war through physical or armed battle. The religion emphasizes war first against worldly passion and the Devil. The word *jihad* connotes 'striving and struggling' towards moral and ethical values. The religion has no scriptural sanction for holy war, unlike the other major religions, Judaism and Christianity. Obedience to Allah and His messenger is central to *jihad*. Thus, *jihad* as waging a war is of post-Qur'anic usage (Johnson, 1977), as the religion clearly forbids combat without explicit reasons, such as defending oneself to protect the community and free believers from persecution and oppression (Boisard, 1988). Physical warfare per se is just a small part of *Jihad* (Hakim, 2016). Some classical scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Abu Muhammad Essam al-Maqdisi of Islam influence the present textual misunderstanding and erroneous interpretations of the concept of *jihad* by present-day *jihadists*. This kind of thinking has narrowed down the significance of the concept to its minute purpose. The word "*jihad*" is mentioned forty-one (41) times in the Holy Qur'an, whose central emphasis is the fear of Allah, obeying the messenger, performing religious tenets and sincerity of purpose. Waging war is secondary and has stringent criteria, too. Thus, the struggle for revivalism can better be understood as a war of political domination and conquest, not a religious war per se (Johnson, 1977). This explains its being diverted through warfare, suicide bombing, murder, assassination, destruction, kidnapping and enslavement, occupation and setting up a state.

However, Yusuf's revivalism is not spontaneous spiritual rebirth of a messianic type, as seen in Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini rebellion, but rather a moderately reformist movement seeking followership in order to lead people back to what he thought to be the real Islam. He was more of a follower of Syed Abu Al'a Maududi than a radical Islamic propagandist. Maududi was a Pakistani religious leader and Islamic philosopher, who moved Pakistan through politics and political involvement from a secular to an Islamic Republic. Yusuf attempted to implement his theological program within the democratic political framework. That explains Yusuf's and his group's 2003 election involvement and the installation of Ali Modu Shariff as the Governor of Borno State. The group was rewarded with a slot in the State Executive Council. A staunch member of the group, Alhaji Buji Foi, occupied the seat as Commissioner for Religious Affairs.

### 1.2 Germination of Yusufiyya Ideology

Yusuf's charisma, eloquence and rhetoric drew a large number of supporters, particularly among the youth and the poor (Salkida, 2012), who saw him as a savior against the nation's injustice and maladministration. Despite being regarded as a redeemer, he never claimed to be one nor elevated his status to that of a *Mahdi* (i.e., the rightly guided reformer/revivalist or eschatological redeemer) despite the traditional belief in the appearance of such a personality, who would restore the religion to its pristine beginnings in the area (Brakoniecka, 2016). He did not commit the sacrilegious error of Muhammad Marwa, the head of the Maitatsine group and the 1982 Kano rebellion, who claimed prophethood (Hisket, 1987; Adesoji, 2011; and Braji, 1998).

His ability to speak to his audience in their language and provide instances of the situations around them, such as widespread poverty, class exploitation, injustice and dominance, endeared him to them enormously (Cilliers, 2010). Thus, without means of subsistence, the destitute the dispossessed and the uprooted persons without genuine prospects to lead a good life took refuge in the extreme stance of Boko Haram. The majority of its foot soldiers are members of the lumpen proletariat class, motorcycle and taxi drivers, manicurists, shoe-shiners, laborers, school dropouts, *Almajirai* (Qur'anic students), wanderers and the majority of unemployed youth suffering from economic hardships or loss of livelihood due to the drying of Lake Chad and the effects of wars in neighboring Chad, Niger, Mali and Libya.

Yusuf's lectures highlighted armed jihad as an essential responsibility for all Muslims. This became a critical setting for the radicalization and militancy of Boko Haram, which extended throughout Nigeria and the Chad Basin. He was so critical of westernization, regarding it not just as a continuation of foreign dominance but also as a breach of Islamic Law and culture that he founded the short-lived *Yusufiyya* group (Fasure, 2009). His style of lectures for ethical quest was appealing to the impoverished. His sermons and lectures were distributed via audio, video and social media platforms and his writings, such as *Hadhihi Aqidatuna wa Manhaaju Da'awatin (This is Our Creed and the Method of Our Preaching)*, preached the precise implementation of Islamic Law, therefore building an intellectual groundwork. This text laid the intellectual foundation for a more conservative movement bent on transforming the Nigerian society into a caliphate through violent uprisings (Cook, 2018). However, this manuscript is an intellectual borrowing from a *jihadist* scholar, Abu Muhammad Essam al-Maqdisi's book, titled **This is Our Agenda**.

Islamic propaganda means conveying the divine message using dialectical techniques, logical reasoning, argumentation and admonition to attract supporters. Yusuf misused the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith* and incorporated the selected *fatwa* of renowned scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah's (full name, Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-Halim ibn Abd-al-Salam, ibn 'Abdullah, Abu al-Abas, al-Harrani, al-Dimasaqi, al-Hanbali, Taqiyya-al-Din, ibn Tayamiyyah) that matched his personal interest of mobilizing, directing and influencing his followers' thoughts, beliefs and feelings to promote his misguided objectives for leadership and the establishment of a pristine society.

Though his sermons were instigating revivalism, he was never openly confrontational until his group clashed on July 26, 2009 with the security forces in Maiduguri, Borno State, which spread across the neighboring states of Yobe, Bauchi, Kano, Adamawa, Gombe, Niger and Plateau. The insurrection led to the deaths of scores of people. Yusuf was apprehended by the military and handed over to the police. He was killed while under their custody. This murder was the 'smoking gun' (to use Condoleezza Rice (2001-2005), President W. G. Bush's National Security Adviser's words) (Wolf, 2003) that transited the group to become one of the most militant, dreaded and violent terrorist units in the world.

## 2. Evolution to Militancy and Terrorism

"Do not think *jihad* is over. Rather, *jihad* has just begun."

Abubakar Shekau (Tattersall and Maclean, 2010, cited in Pham, 2012:6)

With the killing and displaying of the bullet-ridden body of Muhammad Yusuf, Abu Mohammad Abubakar al-Sheikawi (Shekau) took over the leadership of the group with vengeance in his mind and open opposition to the secular state of Nigeria. Although Shekau's knowledge of Shariah Islamic rules and Arabic was elementary, his closeness to Muhammad Yusuf and bravado endeared him to the followers, who were populated by the dominant tribal group in Borno State, the Kanuri. Sheikh Tahir Ibrahim described the tribe in his poem as "self-elevating people" and "legends for them were (like) the column of a building" (Yusuf, 2016:74). This ethnic group are the most formidable warriors of Boko Haram. Being the "sons of the soil" their knowledge of the surrounding area and coming under the brunt of pervasive poverty for decades explain their commitment to the group's struggle. Shekau turned them into fighting machines and suicide bombers. Familiarity with the surrounding and tacit support of the population, either due to fear or sharing the same ideological belief, explained the numerous successes of the group against the security forces. The group attacks with precision, besieges barracks and confiscates or destroys military arms and installations. Within a short period of time, the group was in control of 20 local government areas of Borno State (Konduga, Kaga, Kala/Balge, Kukawa, Mafa, Marte, Magumeri, Mobbar, Munguno, Ngala, Nganzai, Abadam, Askira/Uba, Bama, Chiko, Dambas, Dikwa, Gubio, Guzamala and Gwoza). The group ran over Damaturu (Yobe State), Mubi (Adamawa State), Bauchi (Bauchi State), Yola (Adamawa State), Kano (Kano State), Kaduna (Kaduna State), Jos (Plateau State), Lokoja (Kogi State) and Minna (Niger State) and other neighboring areas, such as Abuja (Federal Capital Territory). Thus, a movement that began with the purpose of enhancing religious scholarship and upholding puritan theological ethics, returned to the basic tenets by transiting into a terrorist organization. Terrorism is an organized, premeditated and repeated violent action used by either non-state or state actors against civilians and identified opposition groups (in the case of the state actor) for political, religious or social reasons. Non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram use violence unlawfully as a means of intimidating, coercing and instilling fear among citizens in order to undermine constituted authorities. Thus, unlike assassination, which is the selective elimination of influential personalities due to political reasons, terrorism targets citizens randomly for maximum casualties to serve as a message to those in

authority and instill fear among the population. Thus, terrorism all over the world has two fundamental features: the use of violence and the aim of achieving clearly stated political and social objectives. Believing and upholding religious ideology and the right to enforce it leads to their violent predisposition. Extremism is always the driving force behind all terrorist organizations. In addition, terrorist violence is generally not a product of clandestine but of an identified group. The group considers violence central to the cleansing of corrupt establishments. Its first enemy and casualty was the Nigeria Police, whom the group sees as solely responsible for the murder of its leader.

### 3. Abubakar Shekau: The Rise of a Warlord

With the killing of Muhammad Yusuf, the group transitioned to become the world's deadliest terrorist and pseudo-*jihadi* organization under the leadership of Shekau. Unlike the level-headed, refined and pleasant personality of Muhammed Yusuf, Shekau was seen by most analysts as a madman, a brutal psychopath and an arrogant, bloodthirsty lunatic, a ruthless, vicious, brutal, temperamental and an insane warlord (Brakonieck, (2015) and Braji, 2023). He was Kanuri by tribe and born between 1965, 1969 and 1975 in Shekau, Tarmuwa Local Government, Yobe State. He went through the *almajiri* system of education, as most children do, in search of Islamic knowledge, as tradition entails. Finding himself in the Mafoni area of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, he joined the Borno College of Legal and Islamic Studies (now Mohammad Goni College of Legal and Islamic Studies). He dropped out without completing the course and found solace in the company of Muhammad Yusuf, who was a rising scholar in Maiduguri leading a group named *Jamaat Ahlus Sunnah li Dawah wal Jihad*. He was very close to Muhammed Yusuf and recognized as his deputy (Braji, 2023 and Braji, 2023i).

With the death of Yusuf, Shekau took over the mantle of leadership. He used his charismatic personality, bravado, crude knowledge of *Salafism* and multilinguistic ability to cultivate the belief of victimhood among the group. His ability to quote the Qur'an and the *Hadith*, oral sayings and the actions of Prophet Muhammad and promote the need for Islamic puritanism under a caliphate while at the same time depicting the Nigerian state and westernization as enemies through the major local dialects of the area was legendary. Conversing in Kanuri, Arabic, Hausa and Fulfulde mobilized and radicalized the members of the group. He first recorded most of his audio and videos in the most dominant local dialect of the area,

Kanuri, as most of his foot soldiers were Kanuri. Such messages were later translated into Hausa, Fulfulde and Arabic for a larger audience and coverage. This strategy exposed the dominance of the Kanuri ethnic group in the sect (Foucher, 2021).

### 4. The Influence of *Jihadist* Scholars

Abubakar Shekau separated the group from the tutelage of *Izala* and started to act independently by denouncing the authorities for not running the state according to the *Shari'a*. He equated non-compliance with the *Shari'a* with polytheism. His sermons were rooted in the rejection of the secular Nigerian state and the condemnation of western values, public service and governance (Brakonieka, 2016). He used his sermons to polish his views by leaning towards Kharijite's sectarianism and armed *jihadist* scholars, such as Essem Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi, better known as Abu Muhammad Essam al-Maqdasi, a Palestinian-Jordanian cleric known for his hardline ideological extremism (Wagemakers, 2008). Al-Maqdasi was a "purist *jihadi-Salafi*" and a believer in military *jihad*. He mentored Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of *Al-Qaeda*, and influenced the *Al-Qaeda* leaders in Iraq, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. Thus, his sermons, teachings and writings on *Salafi* Islam inspired and enriched terrorists' activities all over the world, including Boko Haram. His *jihadist* website, *Tawhed*, and his books, such as **Millat Ibrahim, This is Our Agenda, Democracy Is a Religion, and The Obvious Proofs of the Saudi State's Disbelief** earned him respect and followership, making him one of the world's most influential *jihadist* theorists and a key ideologue in Islam revivalism.

Like his late leader, Muhammad Yusuf, Shekau also armed himself with Ibn Taymiyyah's theological *fatwas* and writings against *Bidi'a* (innovations) and the promotion of *Jihad* by misusing *Inghimas* (plunging into enemy ranks in order to eliminate as many as possible, thereby sacrificing one's life). The misuse of *inghimas* explains the sect's strategy of using suicide bombing in its fight against the state. Suicide bombing is a deliberate and calculated attack carried out by a person with the intention of killing himself as well as others to achieve specific objectives, which may be political or religious (Choi, (2022) and Hassan, (2008). It is an act in which an individual blows himself up using an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) under his clothing, belongings or Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) fully aware that it will lead to his death and that of others. The explosives are meant to cause maximum destruction and human casualties. The group sanctifies suicide as martyrdom, thereby elevating it to the level

of a sacred duty and obligatory for its members (Bukay, (2006), Afolabi and Yusuf, (2019). It becomes one of its weapons of war against the state. It draws domestic and international attention and achieves its aims of intimidating the society and causing high human casualties and infrastructural destruction (Hassan, (2008).

Beside Ibn Taymiyyah and Abu Muhammad Essam al-Maqdisi, Abubakar Shekau was influenced by other renowned *jihadi* scholars, such as Sayyid Qulb, Anwar al-Awlaki and Abu Bakr Naji. Thus, Boko Haram, under Abubakar Shekau, became a repository for the rebellious ideas of *jihadists* in the Gulf countries. These scholars' massive online and offline messages (books, pamphlets, videos and sermons) are instrumental in inspiring terrorism in the world in general and Nigeria in particular. In spite of Shekau's limited and incoherent understanding of the ideological stands of these scholars, he was fond of randomly referring to and quoting them and other *jihadists* in most of his speeches and mass media outlets, such as videos and YouTube. An Egyptian scholar, Sayyid Qutb (9 October 1906–29 August 1966), who was considered from the post-colonial era to the present as the architect and instigator of radical Islam and an inspirator for violent uprisings (Scott and Mekhennet, 2010; Toth, 2013; Qulb, 1964), has had a great influence on Boko Haram. His books, such as *Fi Zilal-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an)*, *Taswir al-Fanni fi al-Qur'an* and *Ma'alim fi at Tariq* (Milestone), became the ideological foundation of what is termed "Qutbism", which laid the platform for the rebirth of the Islamic world based strictly on the Qur'an. Sayyid Qutb was influential to other scholars, such as Anwar Al-Awlaki (21 April 1971–30 September 2011), for his support of violence and the offensive overthrow of government in order to establish an Islamic state. The west sees him as the "most dangerous person who existed in English-speaking Islam" (Hitchen, 2020:88). Thus, Shekau's indiscriminate attacks of schools, mosques, churches and market-places can be linked with Al-Awlaki's recorded *fatwa* and books, such as *Thawābit 'alā Darb al-Jihad (Constants of the Path of Jihad)* (2005) and **44 Ways to Support Jihad** (2009), which justified violence. His website articles and lectures promoted the need for all Muslims to support violent *Jihad* (Shane, 2015). In a 2009 lecture in Pakistan, titled "The State of the Ummah," he sees *Jihad* as obligatory and not recommended or voluntary for Muslims to either participate physically or support it with other means (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2020; Barclay, 2010; Scott and Mekhennet, 2010; Brachman, 2023). Accordingly, failing to participate is sinful. In the process, Al-Awlaki propagated the killing of a

disbeliever, whether he was a combatant or not (Brachman, 2023; Kirkpatrick, 2014; Scott, 2010). According to the dictum, a disbeliever is anyone who disagrees with the tenets of the sect. Shekau was not the only Nigerian influenced by Al-Awlaki's ideological literature. Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab, who failed in his effort to blow a transatlantic flight through an explosive device hidden in his underwear on December 25, 2009, is a case example. Abdulmuttalab is now serving four consecutive life sentences plus 50 years without the possibility of parole in the United States. Abdulmuttalab met Al-Awlaki in Yemen, where his indoctrination to violently attack "Kuffar" or infidels, was cemented. Al-Awlaki's Islamic theology and extremism propagated through internet outlets have proved to be of great influence on the Islamic State and Boko Haram's extermination of opponents for their version of Islam.

Nevertheless, it was another Islamic ideologue, Abu Bakr Naji's 2004 online text titled *Idarat al-Tawahhush* or *The Management of Savagery*, which has an ideological influence on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) that might have inspired Abubakar Shekau's strategy and battle plan for the weakening of the Nigerian state through the use of guerilla tactics by attacking various weak points and bombing selected sites that were significant and would attract domestic and international attention. This maneuver vexed and exhausted the leadership and weakened the nation. The killing of security men and the kidnapping of school children (such as the 276 Chibok School's girls) destabilize, ridicule and expose the weakness of the state. Through this strategy, members of the group became convinced that the state could be defeated and that the establishment of a caliphate was assured. He urged members to focus on attacking the police and other security forces with the aim of avenging the murder of Muhammad Yusuf and creating chaos and savagery, which will lead to insecurity and the setting up of a caliphate. Such a strategy was expected to shake the security forces' allegiance to the state and attract support from citizens facing pervasive poverty.

Shekau seemed to have studied and adopted these scholars' strategies for *jihad*, whose main pillars, according to their *fatwa*, lectures, texts and social media outputs, are violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening, kidnapping and massacring people. Thus, one can see such influence when Shekau released a video claiming responsibility for the attack on Giwa Military Barrack in March 2014 and his declaration: "I will slaughter... Kill! Kill! Kill!! Today, our religion is nothing but killing" (Barkindo, 2018:64-65). This

rhetoric and behavior were genocidal and led to targeting and hitting the police and other security forces in their barracks, houses and working places all over Nigeria. During the violent campaign, the group murdered, executed and bombed hundreds of police offices and officers in Maiduguri, Bauchi, Gombe, Yola, Damaturu, Jos, Kano, Kaduna and Abuja. Some were kidnapped, lined up and shot or slaughtered and beheaded. No fewer than 389 police officers died and 450 were injured fighting the group from 2009 to 2022. The police lost 24 barracks and 30 stations (Igwe, 2022). This action was posted on social media outlets to induce fear among citizens and attract international attention. Boko Haram's trademark, as that of ISIS, is slaughtering those identified as the enemies of *al-Dawla*, the caliphate state, and the security forces, which are identified as the main culprits for their role in the death of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf, while under their custody and as an impediment to the establishment of a caliphate.

Suicide bombing is one of the strategies of the group against the police, other security forces, in particular, and the public, in general. The first suicide bombing in Nigerian history was the bombing of the police force headquarters on June 16, 2011. A Boko Haram member drove a car full of explosives onto the premises of the police headquarters, christened Louis Edet House, in Abuja. The aim was to assassinate the then Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim, and kill as many policemen as possible. From that singular action, suicide bombings became the trademark of Boko Haram. The group detonated a car packed with explosives at the United Nations building in Abuja, killing 21 people and injuring many more on August 26, 2011. This was followed by the bombing of the Kano Central Mosques on November 28, 2014. Other suicide bombings killed 35 people in Kaduna, 20 in Kano and 118 in Jos on 8 April 2012, 17 June 2012 and 20 May 2012, respectively. This strategy accounted for most of the casualties from 2009 to 2018. In 2018, for instance, there were 30 suicide bombings in the North East alone, leading to the deaths of 297 people (Campbell and Harwood (2018), Cambell (2020) and Onuoha and Temilola (2015).

The group copied the strategy of other Middle East revivalists and Asian nationalist movements, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS and Al-Qaida, by weaponizing women and children as suicide bombers. Boko Haram used more female suicide bombers by deploying about 468 women and girls in 240 suicide bombings (Campbell, 2020), surpassing any other

revivalist and nationalist groups in human history (Onuoha and Temilola, 2015; Kriel, 2017).

The merciless slaughtering, beheading and killing of innocents can be linked to the influence of the first known sect of Islam, the Khawarij/Kharijites (656 AD), that is still active in Oman and some parts of North Africa, such as Tunisia. The group is known for legitimizing violence, killing and confiscating 'infidels' property and being antagonistic to constituted authorities by justifying rebellion. The sect justifies mass murder and spilling blood indiscriminately (Al-Arifi, 2015), as witnessed through bombing mosques, schools and churches or the execution of clerics and over 70 agricultural workers at Zabarmari village, near Maiduguri, on November 28, 2020 (Alfa and Maclean, 2020). In 2012 alone, the group bombed 50 churches, killing at least 366 people. It targeted 23 Islamic clerics and killed 60 people in the process. 74 people were killed in un-Islamic institutions, such as clubs, hotels, etc. (Factsheet Nigeria, (2013)

The appearance of a Khawarij propensity in Shekau and his followers led ISIS to accuse him of being a Kharijite and not a *Salafist*. His indiscriminate killing of innocents, branding them as unbelievers, culminated in his being excommunicated by ISIS and subsequently led to his death through self-suicide (Braj, 2023). Shekau's ill-informed religious wisdom and understanding led to self-glorification, concoction and the misguided interpretation of Islam.

## 5. Conclusion

For decades, Islamic revivalism has had an impact on the world. The quest for an Islamic state takes several forms. In Pakistan, for example, the Islamization of government was peaceful, thanks to the work of renowned Islamic intellectuals, such as Maudidi, who paved the way for the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Others, such as Iran and Afghanistan, experienced the Islamization of government as a result of violent civil conflicts sparked by Islamic fundamentalists and inflamed by the unsuccessful repression of the Shah regime (in Iran) or Soviet foreign force (in Afghanistan). Other Islamization initiatives, such as those in the Philippines, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, have been marred by bloodshed and instability.

However, what this study realized is that murdering or eliminating a leader is never a solution to Islamic revivalism or nationalist uprising. Nor is such an action by the state institution able to bring immediate peace or an end to the conflict. The affected group

often considers such an action as open oppression, thereby providing the stage for militancy, terrorism and the justification of attacking identified state institutions, such as schools as remedies for the wrong done to them. Thus, the expectation that the elimination of leaders would lead to peace becomes a mirage, as more destruction and killing continue.

In the process of avenging the death of its leader and establishment of a caliphate, Boko Haram is influenced by *jihadi* scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Essam al-Maqdasi, Sayyid Qulb, Anwar al-Awlaki and Abu Bakr Naji. Toward Shekau's end, the Khawarij/Kharijite's philosophy of armed struggle was instrumental in Boko Haram's violence and misguided Islamic revivalism.

## References

- Abdulgadic, I.A; (2003) "The Almajiri System of Education in Nigeria Today." A Paper presented at the 21<sup>st</sup> Convocation ceremony of Bayero University Kano, [www.gamji.com/index.php/SJPAS/article/view/637](http://www.gamji.com/index.php/SJPAS/article/view/637)
- Abubakar, A; (2014) "Nigerian Mosque Attack, Death Toll Climbs Over 100, Scores More Hunt", (Nov 28, 2014) *CNN: Breaking US and World News*. Retrieved from [edition.cnn.com](http://edition.cnn.com) on 14 September 2022
- Abimbola, A; "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria," *Africa Spectrum* 45, 2: pp 95-108
- Abubakar, I, H; (2017) "An Appraisal of the Ideological Debate Between Sheikh Isa Pantami and Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf." A Paper prepared for presentation at the conference on Religion and Pugnacity organized by Al-Hikma University, Ilorin in conjunction with Nigerian University Scholars in Religions (NUSREL) held from 20-24<sup>th</sup> 2017 at Al-Hikmah University Auditorium.
- Adedeji, I. D; (2021) "Scarcity in the study of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Notes from the Field (2013-2016). 28 April 2021. *HAL Open Science* [shs.hal.science/halshs-03095874v/document](https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03095874v/document).<https://www.sources-journal.org/412>
- Adesoji, A; (2010) "The Boko Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria", *Africa Spectrum* 45 (2), pp95-108
- Adesoji, A, O; (2011) "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State." *Africa Today*, 57 (40 (Summer 2011) pp 209-233
- African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACfSS) (2020) "Boko Haram and the Islam State in West Africa Target Nigeria's Highways," *Infographic*, December 15, 2020. Retrieved from [africacenter.org](http://africacenter.org) on 23-May 2022
- Afolabi, O. and Yusuf, O; (2019) "Phases of Boko Haram: Manipulation of the Name of God and Religion." *Journal of Peace Research*, 51 (1), pp. 67-91
- African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACfSS) (2020) "Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Target Nigeria's Highways," *Infographic*, December 15, 2020. Retrieved from [africacenter.org](http://africacenter.org) on 23 May 2022
- Agbiboa, D. E; (2013) "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective". *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 3.1, pp 144-157
- Alfa, I. and Maclean, R; (2020) "Executed Farmers were caught between Boko Haram and the Army," *The New York Times* December 10, 2020 Update September 23, 2021. Retrieved <https://www.nytimes.com>africa> on 20 September 23, 2022
- Afzal, M; (2020) "From Western Education is Forbidden" to the World's Deadliest Terrorist Group: Education and Boko Haram in Nigeria." Retrieved from [www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04\\_20200507\\_nigeria\\_boko\\_haram\\_afzal.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf) & usg on 12 July 2022
- Allen-Ebrahiman, B; (2017) "Boko haram has forced 117 children to act as suicide Bombers". *Foreign Policy (FP)* 12 April 2017. Retrieved from [www.foreignpolicy.com](http://www.foreignpolicy.com) on 20 August 2022
- Anderson, J. L; (1998) *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* Grove Press, UK.
- Bowden, M; (2012) *The Finish: The Killing of Osama Bin Ladin* Grove Press, UK.
- Brachman, J; ((2023) "Anwar al-Awlaki: American Radical Cleric", <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anwar-al-Awlaki>
- Brana, J; (2014) "Insecurity in Context: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria". Retrieved from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/536393/on> 4 September 2023
- Braji, I; (1998) "Religious Disturbances Revisited: The Maitatsine Saga." *Triumph Newspaper* (Kano: Nigeria) August 22, 1998
- Braji, I; (2023) "Non-State Violence: The Boko Haram Insurgency and the Assassination of Prominent Community Leaders in Nigeria," *Polac Journal of Social Science and Management Sciences* Vol. 1, Issues 2, October 2023, pp102-118
- Braji, I; (2023i) "The Ideological-Religious Roots of Non-State Violence: The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria" *West African Union University (WAUU) Journal of International Affairs and Contemporary Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2023
- Brakoniecka, S; (2016) "Muhammad Yusuf's Jihad in the Light of the Mahdist Tradition of Northern Nigeria," *Hemispheres*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2016 (Retrieved from [https://academia.edu/29682469/Muhammad\\_yusuf\\_s\\_jihad\\_in\\_the\\_light\\_of\\_the\\_Mahdist\\_tradition\\_of\\_northern\\_Nigeria.hmt](https://academia.edu/29682469/Muhammad_yusuf_s_jihad_in_the_light_of_the_Mahdist_tradition_of_northern_Nigeria.hmt) on 18 August 2022
- Brigaglia, A; (2012a) "Ja'afar Mahmud Adam, Mohammad Yusuf and Al-Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflection on the Genesis of the Boko Haram Phenomenon in

- Nigeria,' *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*, 11(2012), pp35-44
- Brigaglia, A; (2012b) "A Contribution to the History of the Wahhabi Da'wa in West Africa: The Career and the Murder of Sheikh Ja'far Mahmud Adam (Daura, ca 1961/62-Kano 2007) *Islamic Africa*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, pp14-16
- Bukarti, A. B; (2020) "The Origins of Boko Haram –And the Way it Matters, *Hudson Institute* 13 January 2020, Retrieved on 4- August 2023 from <https://www.hudson.org/research/15608-the-origin-of-boko-haram-and-why-its-matters> (archive)
- Bukay, D; (2006) " The Religious Foundation of Suicide Bombings", Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277217826-The-Religious-Foundations-of-Suicide-Bombings> on 21 November 2022
- Campbell, J; (2014) "Kano, Nigeria, Mosque Attack Likely Aimed at Governor, Emir," *Africa in Transition* (Council on Foreign Relation, December 1, 2014). Retrieved from [cfr.org>blog>kano-nigeria-mosque-attack-likely-aimed-at-governor-emir/](http://cfr.org/blog/kano-nigeria-mosque-attack-likely-aimed-at-governor-emir/). Retrieved on 23 September 2022
- Campbell, J. and Harwood, A; (2018) "Boko Haram's Deadly Impact," *Council of Foreign Relations (US)*, August 20, 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.cr.org/article/book-harams-deadly-impact> on 7 August 2022
- Castaneda, J; (1998) *Companero: The Life and death of Che Guavara* 1<sup>st</sup> Vintage Books: New York
- Cherski, J; (2017) "Piety and Power Struggles: The Context, Articulation and Legacy of Ibn Taymiyyah's Conception of Jihad" (Feb, 14, 2017). Retrieved from <https://www.academia.edu/31509070/piety-and-power-struggles-the-context-articulation-and-legacy-ibn-taymiyyah-s-conception-of-jihad> on 21 August 2022
- Choi, S; (2022) "Islam and Suicide terrorism: An Empirical Analysis', *Global Studies Quarterly* (2022), 2, pp1-14
- Cilliers, J; (2010) "Forward" to Okumu, W. and Ikelegbe, A; (eds) *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, Tswana
- Connell, S. and Creek, B; (2012) "To Be or Not to Be: Is Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization? Retrieved from <https://www.semanticsscholar.org/paper/To-Be-Or-Not-To-Be%3A.I.> On 30 July 2022
- Cook, D; (2018) *Translation of Selection from Muhammad Yusuf: Hādhihī 'Aqidatunā Wa-Minhāj Da' Watinā* (This is our Creed and Method of Proclamation). Retrieved from [academic.oup.com](http://academic.oup.com) on 3-September 2022
- Cook, D; (2018i) "Mallam Isa Ali Pantami and Mallam Yusuf Maiduguri," in Kassim, A, and Nwankpa, M; (eds) *The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to Islamic State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Davidson, C. M; (2017) "Why Muammar Qadhafi Really Removed, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 24, Issues 4, pp91-116
- de Montclos, M-A, P; (ed) (2013) *Boko Haram: Anatomy of Crisis*, UK: e-International Relation
- de Montclos, M-A, P; (2014) "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis", *Chathan House Research Paper*, September, pp7-8
- De Witte, L; (2001) *The Assassination of Lumumba (Trans: Ann Wright and Renee Fenby)* Verse: London and New York
- Dikki, M. E; ((2017) " Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria: A Maududian Legacy", *ORGIRISI a New Journal of African Studies* 13 (1), 90. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/3198546-Boko-Haram-in-Northern-Nigeria-A-Maududian-Legacy> on 12 September 2022
- Dunn, G; (2018) "The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeast, Nigeria on Childhood wasting: A Double Difference Study", *Conflict and Health* 12 (6)
- Edinyang, S. D; et al (2020) Almajiri System of Education and the Emergence of Religious Extremists in Nigeria, *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, Vol. 10, No.2, Marchh 2020
- Factsheet Nigeria (2013) *Nigerian Boko Haram's Religiously –Motivated Attacks*, Washington DC, The US Commission on International Religious Freedom, August 2013
- Familusi, O. O; (2018) "Socio-Economic Implication of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria:, *NIU Journal of Social Sciences* (4:2), pp213-223
- Fasure, S; (2009) "A Loaded Season of Violence" *The Nation Newspaper* (Lagos: Nigeria), August 2, 2009
- Foucher, V; (2021) "The Last Words of Abubakar Shekau: A Testament in the Politics of Jihadist Extraversion". Retrieved on September 7, 2023 from <https://doi.org/10.3487/nkl.cf51nwx5>.
- Gari, H, M; (2017) "Militant Islamic Groups in Northern Nigeria". Retrieved from [https://www.academia.edu>Militant Islamic Groups in Northern Nigeria/](https://www.academia.edu/Militant_Islamic_Groups_in_Northern_Nigeria/) on 19 August 2022
- Garzali, K. Y; (2014) "The Role of Kanem-Borno Ulama in Qur'anic Education Before the Colonial Rule in Nigeria." A Paper prepared for presentation, August 2014
- Gourle, S. M; (2012) "Linkages Between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda: A Potential Deadly Synergy," *Global Security Studies*, 3(3):1-14
- Hersh, S. M; (2017) *The Killing of Osama Bin Laden* Penguin Random House: New York
- Hiskett, M; (1987) "The Maitatsine Riot in Kano, 1980": An assessment", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17 (3), pp209-223
- Hitchens, A. M; (2020) *Incitement: Anwar Awlaki's western Jihad* Harvard: Harvard University Press
- Holy Qur'an** (Transliteration in Roman Script with Original Arabic Text and English Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali) 2007: Kitab Bhavan Publishers, Kalan Mahal, Darya Ganj, India.
- Hoover, J; (2015) "How to Read the Medieval Scholar the Islamic State Used to Justify al-Kasasbeh Murder," (6/3/2015) Retrieved from <https://the>

- conversations.com/how-to-read-the-scholar-the-Islamic-State-used-to-justify-al-kasasbeh/ on 4 August 2022
- Hoover, J; (2020) *Ibn Taymiyyah: Maker of the Muslim World*, London: One World Academic
- Ibrahim, J; (1998) "The State of Religion in Nigeria: Forces and Dynamics". *Afrika Zamani* 5&6, pp.39-66
- Ibrahim, J; et al (eds) (2017) *Understanding Community Resilience in the Context of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria* (Kano: Nigeria) Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD)
- Igwe, I; (2022) "389 Police Officers Died Fighting Boko Haram in 11 years-Borno CP", (October 9, 2022) Retrieved on 20 October 2023 from <https://channelstv.com/2022/10/09/389-police-officers-died-fighting-boko-haram-borno-cp/>
- Isichei, E; (1987) "The Maitatsine Uprising in Nigeria, 1980-1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited" *Journal of Religion in Africa* XVII, 3 (1987), pp 194-208
- Karmon, E; (2014) "Boko Haram's International Reach," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, February 2014, pp74-83
- Kassim, A; (2018) "Boko Haram's Internal Civil War: Stealth Takfir and Jihad as Recipes for Schism", in Zenn, J; (ed) *Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency*, New York: Combating Terrorism Centre, 3-32
- Kassim, A; (2015) "Defining and Understanding the Religious Philosophy of Jihadi-Salafism and the Ideology of Boko Haram." *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, 16:2-3, 173-200
- Kassim, A. and Nwankpa, M; (eds) (2018) *The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to Islamic State* Oxford University Press
- Kazimi, N; (2005) "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi," (Sept 12, 2005). *Current Trends in Islamic Ideology; Washington Vol 2* (2005) 59-73, 109. Retrieved from <https://www.proquest.com>docview> on 4 September 2022
- Lewis, P; M; (2002) "Islam, Protest and Conflict in Nigeria, in *Africa Notes* Washington DC, No.10 (December); pp1-10
- Maevskaya, L. B, and Aga, K (2021) "Ibn Taymiyyah and his Fatwas on Forbidden (haram) and Permissible (halal) Issue". *Journal of the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine*, Vol. 28, No. 4, (December 2021); pp82-94
- Mantzikos, I; (2010) "The Absence of the State in Northern Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram". *African Renaissance*, Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp57-62. Retrieved <https://www.africabib.org> on 12 August 2022
- Markovic, V; (2019) "Suicide Squad: Boko Haram's Use of Female Suicide Bombers", *Women and Criminal Justice* 29(1). pp283-302. Retrieved from <https://researchgate.net> on 12 September 2022
- Michael, I. and Bwala, J; (2009) "End of the Road for Boko Haram Leader-How He Attracted Young Fanatics", *Saturday Tribune* Newspaper, (Ibadan: Nigeria) 1 August
- Mohammed, K, (2014) "The Message and Methods of Boko Haram," de Montclos, M-A, P; *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, Nigeria: IFRA
- Molloy, R; (2009) "Deconstructing Ibn Taymiyyah's Views on Suicidal Missions," *Combating Terrorism Center*, March 2009, Volume 2, Issue 3. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/deconstruction-ibn-taymiyah-s-views-on-suicidal-missions/> on 18 March 2022
- Montgomery, W. W; (2008) *Islamic Theology and Philosophy*, New Brunswick, USA, Aldine Transaction,
- Nette, A; (2014) *Bringing Down Gaddafi: On the Ground with the Libyan Rebels* St. Martin's Press: New York
- Nwangwu, C; (2012) "Suicide Bomb: Shehu of Borno, Deputy Gov Borno Survive Attack; 5 Killed". *USAfrica* Online News July 13 2012. Retrieved from [africaonline.com](http://africaonline.com) on 3 September 2022
- Ogbogu, J; (2015) "Analyzing the Threat of Boko Haram and the ISIS Alliance in Nigeria". *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis* vol. 7, No. 8 (September, 2015), pp16-21
- Onuoha, F; "Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria," in de Montclos, M-A, P; (ed) (2014) *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria* IFRA-Nigeria, African Studies Centre
- Oyegbile, O. and Lawan, A; (2009) "Shielding Patrons of Boko Haram, *Tell Magazine* (Lagos: Nigeria) 7 August 2009
- Paracha, N. F; (2015) "Abul Ala Maududi: An Existentialist History." Retrieved from *The Muslim Times* (January 1, 2015) <https://themuslimtimes.info/2015/01/01/abul-ala-maududi-an-existentialist-history/> on 19 August 2022
- Pharm, J. P; (2012) "Boko Haram's Evolving Threat" (2012) *African Security Brief* Number 20, April 30, 2012. Retrieved from <https://africacenter.org/publication/boko-harams-evolving-threat/> on 12 August 2022
- Philips, J. E; (2017) "Causes of the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio: A Historiographical Review", *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 36, 2017, pp18-58.
- Pisa, K. and Hume, T; (2015) "Boko Haram Overtakes ISIS as World's Deadliest Terror Group, Report Says"; *CNN*, November 19, 2015. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/17/world/globe-terror-report/> on 16 August 2022
- Qulb, S; (1964) *Milestones* Egypt: Kazi Publication
- Ratner, M; and Smith, M. S; (2010) *Who Killed Che? How the CIA Got Away with Murder*, OR Book: New York
- Robert, G; (1971) *The Martyrdom of Patrice Lumumba* Neillgo: London
- Robin, M; (1969) *Lumumba: A Biography* Garden City Doubleday: New York
- Saleem, A. O; (2013) "The Psychological Make-Up of Mohammad Yusuf". Retrieved from

- <https://www.e-ir.info> (November 4, 2013) on 3 August 2022
- Salihi, H. M; (2012) "Governance Failure and Political Violence in Nigeria: The Jama'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda 'awati wa;-jihad in Perspective", in Mohammad, H; (ed) *Nigeria's Convulsive Federalism: Perspectives on Flash-Points of Conflict in Northern Nigeria* Ibadan: Nigeria; Cypress Concepts and Solutions Ltd
- Sakilda, A; (2007) "Another Look at Boko Haram Philosophy", *Premium Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opion/106108-another-look-at-boko-haram-philosophy-by-ahmed-salkida.htm> on August 1, 2022
- Sani, S; (2007) *The Killing Fields: Religious Violence in Northern Nigeria* Ibadan: Spectrum Books
- Scot, S; (2015) "Internet Firms Urged to Limit Work of Anwar al-Awlaki.", *New York Times* December 18, 2015
- Scot, S. and Mekhennet, S; (2010) "Anwar al-Awlaki: from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad", *New York Times* May 8, 2010
- Shehu, S; (2018) "A Historical Review of Islam in Kanem-Borno," Retrieved from [https://www.academia.edu/42268619/A\\_Historical\\_Review\\_of\\_Islam\\_in\\_Kanem\\_Borno](https://www.academia.edu/42268619/A_Historical_Review_of_Islam_in_Kanem_Borno) on 18 July 2022
- Silber, M. D; and Bhatt, A; (2007) *Radicalization in the West: The Home grown Threat*, New York City: NYPD Intelligence Division
- Salaam, A. O; (2013) "The Psychological Make-up of Mohammed Yusuf". Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info> (Nov 4, 2013) on 3 August 2022
- Salati, A; (2017) "What is the difference between the Tijaniya sect in Islam and Sunni". (19 June 2017). Retrieved from <https://www.quora.com/what-is-the-difference-between-the-tijaniya-sect-in-islam-and-sunni> on 12 July 2022
- Salihi, H. M; (2012) "Governance Failure and Political Violence in Nigeria: The Jama'aatul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati wal-Jihad in Perspective", in Mohammed, H; (ed) *Nigeria's Convulsive Federalism: Perspectives on Flash-Points of Conflict in Northern Nigeria* (2012) Ibadan: Nigeria, Cypress Concepts and Solutions Ltd
- Sani, S; (2007) *The Killing Fields: Religious Violence in Northern Nigeria*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books
- Shattima, K; (2015) "Democracy and Security in Northeast: The Borno Story," *Daily Trust* Newspaper, (Abuja: Nigeria) 26 July 2015
- Smith, M; (2015) *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria's Unholy War* London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd
- Spannaus, N; (2007) *The Azāriqa and the Violence Among the Khawarij* (A.M. Thesis Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations; Harvard University, 2007 Retrieved from [https://www.academia.edu/The\\_Azariqa\\_and\\_the\\_Violence\\_among\\_the\\_Khawarij](https://www.academia.edu/The_Azariqa_and_the_Violence_among_the_Khawarij) on 4 September 6, 2022
- Specia, M; (2017) "Who Are Sufi Muslims and Why Do Some Extremists Hate Them" (Nov 24, 2017) Retrieved from
- <http://www.nytimes.com/middleeast> on 14 August 2022
- Tatah, A.M; (nd) "The Origin of Boko Haram....UnIslamic Practices...." Retrieved from [http://www.academia.edu/8326952/THE\\_ORIGIN\\_OF\\_BOKO\\_HARAM\\_UNISLAMIC\\_PRACTICES\\_PART](http://www.academia.edu/8326952/THE_ORIGIN_OF_BOKO_HARAM_UNISLAMIC_PRACTICES_PART) on 18 July 2022
- Tattersall, N. and Maclean, W; (2010) "Nigerian Sect Leader Praises al Qaeda, Warns US," *Reuters*, July 31, 2009. (Cited in Pharm, J. P; (2012) "Boko Haram's Evolving Threat" (2012) *African Security Brief* Number 20, April 30, 2012. Retrieved from <https://africacenter.org/publication/boko-harams-evolving-threat/> on 12 August 2022
- The Economist*, (2015), "Salafism: Politics and the Puritanical." 27 June. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/06/25/politics-and-the-puritanical> on 20 October 2022
- Thueson, A. "The Disease is Unbelief: Boko Haram's Religious and Political Worldview". *Analysis Paper: The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World*, No. 22, January 2016
- Thurston. A; (2018) *Boko Haram: The History of An African Jihadist Movement*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Thurston, A; (2016) *Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching and Politics* Cambridge University Press
- Tønnessen, T. H; (2017) Islamic State and Technology – A Literature Review," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 11, Issue 6, January 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.ffi.no/en/publications-achive/islamic-state-and-technology-a-literature-review> on 4- January 2022
- Upal M. A; and Cusack, C. M; (2021) *Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements* Leiden and Boston: Brill Handbooks.
- Usman, B. and Alkali, N; (eds) (1983) *Studies in the History of Precolonial Borno* Zaria: Northern Nigerian Publication Company
- Wagemakers, J; (2008) "Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisi", *Combating Terrorism Centre*, May 2008, vol.1, Issue 6. Retrieved from <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-a-counter-terrorism-asset> on 16 June 2022
- Wagemaker, K; (2009) "A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The ideology of Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 36, No. 2 (August 2009), pp281-297
- Wagemaker, J; (2012) *A Quitist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Muhammad al-Maqdisi* Cambridge University Press
- Walker, A; (2016) "Join us or die: The Birth of Boko Haram," *The Guardian*, February 4, 2016. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/joi-us-or-die-birth-of-boko-haram>.
- Walker, A; (2012) "What is Boko Haram," Washington DC, United State Institute of Peace: *Special Report*, (June 2012) Retrieved from

- <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf>  
 f on 16 March 2022
- Watt, M. W; (1973) *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* Edinburgh, University Press
- Webber et al, (2017) "The Road to Extremism: Field and Experimental Evidence that Significance Loss-induced Need for Closure Fosters Radicalism". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 114: 270-285
- Weiss, M. and Hassan, H; (2015) *ISIS: Inside the Story of Terror* New York: Regan Arts
- Wolf, B, (2003) "Searching the Smoking Gun", Interview with Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser to President Bush (September 8, 2003). Retrieved from <https://www.com.cnn/2003/US/01/01/wbr.smoking.gunn/p>
- Wright, Z; (2015) "Salafi Theology and Islamic Orthodoxy in West Africa" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 35 (3) :647-656 Retrieved from [https://www.academia.edu/38294194/Salafi\\_theology\\_and\\_Islamic\\_Orthodoxy\\_in\\_West\\_Africa](https://www.academia.edu/38294194/Salafi_theology_and_Islamic_Orthodoxy_in_West_Africa) on 22 August 2022
- Yossef, R, and Shahab, A; (2010) *Ibn Taymiyyah and His Times*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Yusuf, M. A; et al (2013) "Problems and Prospects of Integrated Almajiri Education in Northern Nigeria", *Scientific Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences* 2 (3)
- Yusuf, S; ((2016) *A History of Islam, Scholarship and revivalism in Western Sudan: Being An Anointed Translation with Introduction of Infaqul-mansur fi Tarikh Bilad al-Tukurur of Sultan Muhammad bello Bin Fodio* Tazama Publishing Company
- Zanna, L. H; (1993) *Scholars and Scholarship in History of Borno* Zaria: The Open Press
- Zenn, J; (ed) (2018) *Boko Haram Beyon Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency*, Combating terrorism Centre at West Point, US Military Academy, pp 64-65
- Zubaidah, S and Zulkifli, M. "Doctrine and Thought of Khawarij and the Implications in the Present Context," *International Journal of Applied Engineering Research*, Vol. II, Number 6, (2016), pp4247-4251